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ABSTRACT
The steady improvement of US Nuclear Utility generation capability observed over the past two
decades has recently halted and somewhat degraded For the industry to resume its upward trend in
performance a detailed examination must be performed of current performance and new methods
developed to continue the improvement A detailed study of Boiling Water Reactor, Class IV (BWR/4)
performance over the past five years was conducted to gain insight to the nature of lost generation
capability and develop a methodology to improve capability. Extensive electronic NRC records were
used in conjunction with detailed power plant records and engineering experience at PECO Energy's
Limerick Generating Station and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station for this research.
Administrative or regulatory shutdowns within the study dominated the lost generation capability
and detracted from the goal of analy2ing equipment reliability. Nine of two hundred thirty five
shutdowns were therefore limited to maximum impact of 30 days lost generation. Balance of Plant
system failures were found to initiate 69% of the occurrences of lost generation capability and account
for 59% of the capability loss. The failures of these systems were found to be infrequent events which
correlated poody to the aggregate industry experience. Approximately fifty' percent of the forced outages
were the result of equipment related failures such as weak design or worn parts with the remaining fifty
percent the result ofhuman related failures. Only 19% of the failures were noted to be the result of
component age related failures while 31% of the failures were related to poor equipment design.
The time frame of forced outages with in operating cycles was additionally reviewed. Failures
were found to be more frequent in the early phase of the operating cycle following start up from a
refueling and approximately 400 to 550 days after start up. The impact of these failures was not great
enough to affect the steady state cumulative capability factor of the aggregate BWR/4 utility achieved
after one year of operation. Individual utility sites were found to have opposing strong and weak periods
of performance within their operating cycles. The loss of generation capacity taken for planned
maintenance outages and on line maintenance for minor equipment problems was not found to have a
significant impact on aggregate BWR/4 performance. For plants not involved in lengthy shutdowns, the
strongest impacts on cumulative capacity were forced outages, initial start up and coast down.
The unpredictable and design nature of system failures necessitates a structured effort to
improve the combined performance of all systems at a utility. Balance of Plant systems were found to
all have a 25% probability of causing a single forced outage lasting slightly less than 5 days in length. The
infrequent nature of significant failures necessitates a broad based communication between utilities to
maintain an adequate level of awareness of system vulnerabilities and possible improvements. Two
specific sites examined had opposing and repeatable strong and weak cycle performance traits. The
unique nature of site performance demonstrates the impact that improved communications between
utilities could have on transferring strengths and diminishing weaknesses thus improving overall utility
performance.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Impetus
The US Nuclear Power Industry has realized a nearly steady improvement in its mean
capacity factor from approximately 60% in the mid 1980's to above 75% in the mid 1990's. This
steady upward trend was noted to begin faltering in 1996 with the first reduction in mean
capacity noted in seven years, Figure 1 . During the same period refueling outages were
decreasing in length and operating cycles were extending in length. It was unclear whether the
industry had begun to see the impact of a ceiling on capacity or whether the shifts in operating
regimes had created a period of unsettled performance. A fundamental question to be answered
of
was whether utility equipment reliability could support a significant extension operating cycle
length. A secondary question was whether utilities could continue to significantly improve their
performance regardless of operating cycle length.
When compared to other countries performance, as shown in Figure 2, it does not
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Figure 1. US Gross Mean Capacity and Outage Length 1985 - 1997 1
1 US Gross Mean Capacity data from annual report of nuclear generation capacity in Nucleonics Week, 1986 - 1998, RFO data from
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Figure 2. Mean Capacity Factor by Nation, 1 981 - 1 9972
operation in 1 997 are shown in this figure. Finland
,
with only four plants, is additionally shown
as a dashed line as it has had such consistently strong performance. Argentina, Belgium, Hungary,
Mexico, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Taiwan all also had less than 10 operating
plants and achieved mean gross capacity factors of greater than eighty percent in 1997. They
were not drawn in the figure to keep from cluttering it and as they are less representative of the
US with its large number of plants. Of interest the country with the highest annual capacity,
Finland, utilizes one year operating cycles with highly efficient, short, refueling outages.
Although there are dramatic differences in the regulatory environments between the nations,
with thirteen nations operating at greater than eighty percent mean capacity, it appears that there
should be room for further improvement within the US industry from its current mean capacity
of seventy percent
Capacity factor is a good indicator of nuclear power plant performance as it is assigned
without interpretation but has shortcomings when analyzing equipment reliability because the
negative impacts of planned maintenance outages and intentional reductions obscure operational
2 Data to generate graph taken from annual report of nuclear generation capacity in Nucleonics Week, 1982 - 1998
performance. Capability factor disregards these intentional losses and is defined as the
percentage ofmaximum energy generation that a plant is capable of supplying, limited only by
factors within the control of plant management. Recent US capability factors and unplanned
capability loss factors are provided in Figure 3. The median capability factor flattens out and
does not respond as adversely in the post 1995 period as the mean capacity factor. This reflects
the strong impact of a minority of plants' which experienced poor performance. With the mean
so high and the negative impact of a forced outage so large, this is not surprising.
A collaborative research project was executed with PECO Energy, formerly Philadelphia
Electric Co., to examine the losses of availability at their four Boiling Water Reactor, Class 4
(BWR/4) Power Plants; Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1 and 2 and Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3. PECO Energy had recently increased the
operating cycles at all four plants from 1 8 months to two years and was setting industry records
by refueling in less than 30 days. PECO was concerned with the ability of the Balance of Plant
systems to support the extended operating cycles with less time spent in planned maintenance
outages. They had started a program entitled Balance of Plant 700 (BOP-700) with a primary
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Figure 3. US Nuclear Power Plant Operational Capability 1 980 - 1 997 3
3 Data from INPO presentation of Mr.Bill Webster, January 13, 1998
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entered into a cooperative research project with PECO Energy centered around BOP-700. The
goals of this research agreement were to: A) Determine single and conditional points of failure,
which would include (1) a review of local records for past sources of lost capacity, (2) a review of
industry records for sources of lost capacity', and (3) an analysis of systems to determine potential
single or conditional points of plant failure. B) Develop a process to utilize the broadest
practical knowledge base to improve Balance of Plant reliability. C) Establishment of a Focus on
Improvement Team (FIT team) process to find engineering solutions for weak system and
components.
1.2 Confinement of Study to US BWR/4 Plants over a Five Year Period
The BWR/4 plant was selected as a case study plant representative of the industry
performance. The research agreement with PECO provided a detailed source of information for
BWR/4 performance at four specific plants. The US BWR/4 performance was seen as
characteristic ofUS fleet aggregate performance, see Figure 4, and large enough with 19 plants to
provide a significant sample yet small enough in number that every outage record could be
reviewed. The plants designs were similar in nature such that the experiences of one plant could
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Figure 4. US versus US BWR/4 Median Three year capacity 4
4 Data to generate graph taken from annual report of U.S. capacity factors in Nuclear News, 1987 - 1996, DER is the Design Electric
Rating
II
provide sufficient depth to the analysis at each plant and yet remain representative of current
operation conditions.
Figure 5 presents the relative performance of all US nuclear power plants, the BWR/4
plants used for this study and the PECO plants used for detailed analysis. Histograms of plant
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x-axis - Plant annual gross capacity percentage for year of histogram
Figure 5. Plant Gross Capacity Comparison, US vs. BWR/4 vs. PECO5
5 Data to generate graph taken from annual report of U.S. capacity factors in Nucleonics Week, Feb. 11, 1192 and Feb. 12, 1998
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column represents the number of plants which had the indicated range of gross electrical
capacity for the given year. The green column represents the entire US nuclear industry, blue
BWR/4 and red PECO. The annual gross capacity presented here is more volatile than the
three year average data presented in Figure 4 but has the advantage of presenting a more time
sensitive response to current performance. Note that the overall 1992 performance of the US
industry is bimodal with a normal in appearance distribution of plants centered at 75% gross
electrical capacity and a small number of plants producing no or little power. In 1 997 the
distribution has become even more separated. The performance of the better plants has
improved with the median of the upper distribution moving up to 85%. In the same year the
number of plants producing no or little power has dramatically increased. The BWR/4
performance and the PECO performance are seen to be characteristic of the US performance
with the exception of the increased fraction of members producing no or little power. The
issues surrounding the long term shut downs are regulatory and administrative in nature. As this
research is focused on improving plant system reliability, it is basically focused on the upper
performance group. A better understanding of the increasing trend towards long term
shutdowns is a topic worthy of further research.
1.3 Research Goal
The primary goal of this research is to explore the capability of existing US Nuclear
Power Plants to reliably support extended operating cycles. A secondary goal is to formulate a
strategy to continue the process ofimproving industry wide plant reliability. These goals will be
accomplished through a detailed review of on site BWR/4 system failures at the four PECO
plants and a broader review ofNRC BWR/4 utility record data. Failures will be categorized by
the primary system responsible, root cause, causal nature, time in the operating cycle of
occurrence and precursor events. This report should provide the reader with a qualitative
understanding for the causes of lost generation capacity, the ability of installed systems to
support extended operating cycles and methods that could by used to correct short comings.
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1.4 Design of Research and Presentation of Report
Several studies outlined below were conducted to support the above goals. The sources
of data for these studies will be summarized and then each of the studies reviewed. These results
will then be applied to develop a means for the US nuclear industry to improve its capability and
for the project to assess the impact of extended cycle operation on utility reliability.
A. Systemic review of failures - Categorize all reductions in generation capacity by the single
system most responsible for the reduction. Develop statistics for the impact of system
failures with respect to the frequency of causing a reduction in generation capacity and
the cumulative lost generation potential attributed.
B. Causal Failure Analysis
i) Categorize all reductions in generation capacity by one of six component failure
causal factors; age, design, fabrication, installation, maintenance, and operation.
ii) Categorize all reductions in generation capacity by the root cause of their failure
as either caused by human or equipment factors. Further subdivide these
categories where data is sufficient.
C. Operating Cycle Forced Outage Analysis
i) Categorize all reductions in generation capacity by the time in the operating cycle
in which they occur. Develop statistics for the likelihood of failure with time in
the operating cycle and the expected lost generation with time in cycle.
Determine the cumulative effect of forced outages with time in operating cycle.
ii) Compile the daily average generation of each plant in the study over five years
of completed operating cycle performance. Express the data in terms of
capacity versus day in operating cycle. Modify the data to disregard start up
power ascension and coast down. Use this aggregate data to cross check the
14
similar forced outage data above and to note the effect of planned maintenance
outages excluded from the above data.
iii) Analyze forced outages to determine if specific operating cycle events such as
refueling maintenance or planned maintenance outages present a measurable risk
to follow on failures.
D. Work with PECO Energy in their development the Focus on Improvement Team (FIT)
process and apply lessons learned from this process to a generalized industry
improvement process.
1.5 Organization ofpaper
Following this introduction chapter two will present an overview of the uniquely
compiled data sources. Chapters three through five will present each of the three broad studies
outlined above. Lessons learned from PECO Energy's Focus on Improvement Team process,
with regard to plant reliability improvement, will then be presented in chapter six. Chapter seven
will summarize the accomplishments of this research and how its findings can answer the
research goals. An attempt has been made to include all original material constructed for this
research in the appendix section to assist others in continuing research on this topic. Definitions
for unfamiliar terms may be found in Appendix 4, the NRC glossary of terms.
15
2. Sources of data
The following three major sources of data were utilized for this research; daily average
power data sent to the NRC by all nuclear utilities and compiled by INEEL, monthly reports of
significant events sent to the NRC by all nuclear utilities and compiled by INEEL, and PECO
Energy plant specific data. The NRC records were valuable in that they are extensive, have strict
reporting requirements and cover all power plants in the United States. The data base work
done with these records by INEEL made the records easily accessible as manageable sections of
detailed data could be located rapidly. Access to the engineering staffs of the four PECO Energy
power plants with their plant records provided a detailed ability to review specific reliability
issues with the engineers and management staff that resolved the equipment problem in
question. This means of directly accessing the root cause of equipment failures and the
vulnerabilities of systems was not possible with the broader NRC records. The cooperative
research agreement with PECO Energy also provided a professional source with which to
review the NRC records. The derivation of each data base is discussed separately below.
2.1 PECO Energy Plant Specific Data
The daily power generation history "skyline" for each of the four PECO plants was
reviewed for the five year period of the study. A skyline for one operating cycle of a sample
plant is shown below in Figure 6. Each reduction of greater than 10% was analyzed in detail.
Examples of forced outages and undesired reductions in power are highlighted in red. Examples
of operationally required reductions in power are highlighted in blue (W - water box cleaning, R
- rod pattern shifts, PMO - planned maintenance period). Forced outages and undesired
reductions in generation capacity were analyzed in detail. An example of the data collected is
provided in Figure 7. The following characteristics assigned to each period of lost generation,
column designations are provided in parentheses were ambiguous;
Effective Outage Days- computed from the generation capacity that the plant would
have been capable of generating had the failure not occurred.
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Figure 6. Sample Operating Cycle Skyline
System - One system was assigned as responsible for each outage. In some instances this
was a complex decision as a reduction in power may have been taken to repair several systems.
If a start up from a forced outage was prevented due to the failure of another system, that event
was treated as a separate outage. An attempt was made to limit the number of system categories
such that related failures could be noted. Approximately twenty system categories were
developed for all of the failures noted which resulted in a significant reduction in generation
capability.
Failure details (Date, Type, Component, Failure, Cause, Issue #) - Details of the
component failure and load reduction were noted for future use such as the type of plant loss
(scram, load drop, run back), the mode of component failure, a description of the failure, the
failed component, the cause of the failure and the PECO failure record number.
Root cause of failure (Category) - Each failure was categorized as either an equipment
failure or a human failure. When possible, these two broad categories were then further













Component failure mode (Class) - Each failure was additionally categorized by one of six
of the following failure attributes to better understand the nature of the failure and the possible







Conditional Relation of Failure (Dependence) - If the failure was significantly
influenced by another operating cycle event such as the previous refueling outage, the previous
planned maintenance outage or an operational power transient, this link was noted for the future
correlation of failures.
}">">
Time in operating cycle of failure (days^ef start of cycle, days from end of cycle) - The
number of days following start up from the refueling outage to the event were noted as well as
the number of days from the event to the end of the operating cycle. This data would be later
used to determine the risk of incurring failures with respect to the time in an operating cycle.
The overall statistics for the specific PECO five year plant data collected for the study is
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Figure 7 . Samp le PECC) plant data
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Table 1 . Summary ofPECO Lost Generation Capacity Data
Site LGS PBAPS
Total occurrences 97 99
Average occurrences per year per plant 9.7 9.9
Total effective full power outage days 136 193
Average outage days per plant per year 13.6 19.3
provided in Table 1 . The complete data set collected is provided in Appendix 1 for LGS and
Appendix 2 for PBAPS.
2.2 NRC Monthly reports, INEEL MORP 2
This data is historically referred to as "Gray book data". Entries are required in this
record for any significant event and any event which affects reactor power level or operating
conditions. There are over one thousand entries for the BWR/4 plants studied over the five
years of the study. Many of these entries are of little quantitative use as there is no associated
record made of the total effect of the event on generation and many events are included which
do not relate to equipment reliability. One of the specific reporting requirements for this record
is to note any event which removes the main electrical generator from service and the hours that
the generator was offline as a result of the event The data record was then truncated by only
considering events for which there were recorded generator offline service hours and events
which were the result of an unplanned equipment failure. These remaining entries are
considered equivalent to the accepted definition of a forced outage. It is noted that the recorded
impact of each outage is in lost time of generation not in lost generation power. The net result
was a file of 235 forced outages at the 19 BWR/4 plants over the 5 years of the study or 2.5
forced outage events per plant per year.
While the narrative descriptions of the events in the NRC record were very useful, the
outage causing system and component listings were inconsistent Each NRC record of events
for the 19 BWR/4 plants were therefore reviewed with a PECO engineer to assign a failed
system consistent with the designations used earlier. The human versus equipment failure
attributes were additionally assigned based on the narrative and the recorded fields of outage
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Figure 8. Sample NRC event Data Base
compiled data base is included as Appendix 3. A glossary of the NRC terms used in the data
base is included as Appendix 4.
2.3 NRC Daily Reports, INEEL MORP 3
The daily average power from each power plant is reported to the NRC in a monthly
table and compiled by INEEL as MORP3 data. This data was used to recreate a skyline profile
for each plant in the study for each operating cycle. There was some inconsistenq* noted in the
reporting of gross versus net electrical generation. To resolve this issue and focus on equipment
reliability concerns, the data from each operating cycle was modified from megawatts of electric
generation to percentage ofgeneration capacity such that the highest output power in the
operating cycle reflected 100 percent generation. Additionally the data was indexed to the day in
a plant's operating cycle vice the calendar day. This would allow the operating cycles to be added
in a parallel operating cycle manner presented later in the report A separate record was
generated for each operating cycle in which the coast down portion was modified to reflect
generation capability vice capacity. This daily generation capacity and capability data base has
exceptional accuracy with which to characterize the cyclic performance of the utilities owing to
the greater than 30,000 record entries for both capacity and capability. The power generation
profile of Figure 6 was generated by this data base. The capacity and capability skylines for each
of the operating cycles used for this research study are provided as Appendix 5. These skylines
were additionally used to verify that every forced outage was captured by the monthly data bases
described above.
20 (
2.4 INEEL NRC Report Formats
The INEEL electronic databases were found to be extremely useful for this research. A
sample of each record has been included as Appendix 6. There are four basic records; MORP1
which provides a monthly summary of information for each plant such as points of contact,
ratings, generation and capacity factors for the month and the year to date, MORP2 which
contains the event reports discussed earlier, MORP3 which provides a monthly summary of the
daily average electrical power generation for each plant, as discussed earlier, and lastly STATUS
which is a summary of the daily status report made by the plant to the NRC.
21
3. Initiating System Failure Analysis of Plant Unavailability
This portion of the research analyzes the impact of system reliability on BWR/4 utility
performance. BWR/4 system failure data of events which resulted in a forced outages were
retrieved from the broad NRC data base. This information was contrasted to specific plant data
obtained from the four PECO Energy BWR/4 plants. Each forced outage or period of reduced
generation analyzed was attributed to a single system failure. This focused attention on those
system failures which have a direct impact on plant performance. This is contrasted to an
unrestrained study of equipment repairs or system failures which would give equal weight to the
many failures which do not affect overall plant performance.
It is also possible that a maintenance outage could have been taken to repair several
faulty systems and all systems but the one credited with the failure would have their failure rates
underreported. The supposition was made that if a system was weak enough to fail frequently it
would not be able to avoid identification eventually as the system responsible for an outage. As
this study covered 19 plants for a 5 year period, nearly 100 reactor years of operation were
analyzed. This time frame should have been large enough to capture the signature of a system
that is significandy impacting plant reliability. Additionally while many systems may be worked
upon during a mid-cycle outage the supposition was also made that the decision to come offline
was primarily the result of a significant singular system failure. The identification of this critical
failure was a difficult one for which the assistance of the collaborating PECO staffwas essential.
3.1 BWR/4 System Reliability Impact on Plant Capability
The NRC records for every removal of the main generator from line at each of the 19
BWR/4 plants during the five year study was reviewed to determine whether the outage was
the result of a system failure. The term system failure was broadly interpreted to include any
event which resulted in the undesired or unplanned loss of generation. Many reported
planned outages were reclassified as forced outages based on this assessment For example, an
outage planned two weeks in advance to repair a leaking seal on a pump would have been
reported in the NRC data as a planned maintenance outage but was assigned as a forced outage
for this study as the outage would not have been taken had the pump not failed. Some planned
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maintenance outages were taken as part of the scheduled operating cycle and were not in this
plant reliability study as a forced outage. These were generally noted to occur prior to a refueling
outage to conduct general plant shut down maintenance.
Two hundred and thirty five outages were identified in the study for a mean outage rate
of 2.5 outages per plant per year. Five thousand four hundred and seventy nine days of outage
were accumulated for a mean lost generation of 58 days per plant per year. This lost capacity is
very7 large and would account for a loss of 16% capacity. Figure 9 provides a summary of the
annualized days of forced outage per system. It is noted that several significant system outages
dominate the results. Browns Ferry Unit 1 remained shutdown for the entire five years of the
study as the result ofTVA and NRC operational safety concerns. Note that the category of
operations was created for operator-related failures. Brown's Ferry Unit 2 was additionally
shutdown for the first 3 Vz years of the study over the same issues. Brunswick Units 1 and 2
were shutdown one year and Cooper Station for nine months as the result of diesel technical
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Figure 9. BWR/4 Days of forced outage by failed system
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dominant effect on the overall system reliability results. While this risk of large losses due to
regulator action is a significant risk of nuclear power generation, its effects obscure the impact
that individual system reliability have on overall plant capability. Hence, to limit the total impact
of any singular failure, a maximum outage length of one month was assessed for each outage.
This resulted in the truncation of 9 of the 235 outages to 30 days. With a resultant 14.3 days of
modified forced outage per plant per year or an average forced outage length of 5.8 days. This
yielded a mean forced outage rate of 3.9%.
Figure 10 provides a summary of the occurrences of system failures which resulted in a
forced outage and the total days of forced outage accumulated by those system failures, as
modified above. The gray bars represent the occurrence rate of each system failure resulting in a
forced outage. Main Turbine, Electro-Hydraulic Control System (EHC) and Feedwater (FW)
system failures are noted to most frequently be the cause of plant forced outage. Colored bars
represent the mean annual days of forced outage attributed to each system, with the appropriate
scale on the right. The colors of the bars represent the groupings of the systems. Balance of
: Balance of Plant Forced Outage Days
= Primary / Safety Systems Forced Outage Days
Oh
System
Figure 10. Comparison - BWR/4 forced outage days and failure frequency by system
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Plant systems, those systems not included in the primary and safety related system category, were
colored red. Primary or safety related systems which have historically received much greater
maintenance and design attention have been colored blue. External system failures such as a loss
of the electrical distribution grid resulting in a forced outage have been colored yellow. Note that
the percentage of the total lost generation capability attributed to one system can be read on the
left vertical scale while the average annual days of unavailability per plant attributed to a given
system is read on the right vertical scale.
Balance of Plant system failures were found to initiate 69% of the forced outage
occurrences and account for 59% of the lost generation. Primary/ safety related system failures
initiated 27% of the forced outages and accounted for 38% of the lost generation. It is observed
that the Balance of Plant failures initiated the vast majority of the utility lost generation events
and a lesser majority of the aggregate lost generation capacity. Balance of plant system failures
were found to initiate 1.73 forced outages per year per plant of a mean length of 4.9 days.
Reactor/ safety related system failures were found to initiate 0.7 forced outages per year of a
mean length of 8.1 days. It is noted that Balance of Plant system failures more frequendy initiated
a forced outage while the resultant forced outage was of a shorter duration than those initiated by
a Primary/ safety system failure. This supports the intuitive understanding that Reactor/safety
related systems are much more reliable due to redundancy of design, higher quality components
and more tightly controlled maintenance and operation but that a failure of one of these systems
significant enough to force an outage is more difficult to recover from than a Balance of Plant
system initiated forced outage.
Main Turbine system failures caused the majority' of the forced outages and consumed
the majority of the lost generation capacity. These failures were mechanical in nature and
included excessive turbine vibration, failure of the turbine (loss of buckets and related significant
damage) and control valve leakage. The vulnerability of this large piece of capital equipment is
evident. Electro-Hydraulic Control system failures were noted to frequendy initiate forced
outages but to accumulate proportionally less outage time. As this system governs the steam
demand of the reactor^it is self evident how its failures could so readily end in a plant outage.
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These failures tended to be predominantly of a piping system or control system stability nature.
The operations system category was created for forced outages which were the result of
regulatory or management operator safety concern. This category did not include the
misoperation of a system or regulatory technical specification outages which were attributed to
the system with which there was concern. While four out of the seven outages in this category
were truncated to 30 days, the system grouping still accounted for a significant portion of the lost
generation capacity. It is noted that the relative failure frequency is low in comparison to the lost
generation capacity because these outages are individually very long. One can then characterize
the predominance of a system to cause short or long outages when they do occur by contrasting
the gray with the colored bars of Figure 10 or the frequency of outage with the mean annual lost
capacity. The diesel is noted to pose a significant risk for lengthy outage while the generator is
seen to pose little risk for a lengthy outage. A better understanding of the types of system
failures in each grouping can be gained from a close review ofAppendix 7. This appendix is the
compiled NRC forced outage data used in the study sorted by failure system and then length of
outage.
3.2 PECO Energy Plant Specific Data
System failures at the four PECO Energy BWR/4 plants which resulted in a loss of 10%
generation capacity or more were analyzed in a manner similar to that discussed above. It should
be noted that this is a stricter analysis constraint than the forced outage limitation of the BWR/4
= Balance of Plant Lost
Figure 11. Lost Generation Capacity by System and Occurrence, Limerick Units 1 and 2
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NRC data (100° b power reduction). The compiled data for the LGS site is presented in Figure
1 1 . Balance of plant systems failures accounted for 74% of the periods of reduced generation
capacity and 54% of the total lost capacity while Reactor/safety system failures resulted in 24%
of the periods of reduced generation and 42% of the lost capacity. These results were similar to
those found with the greater BWR/4 forced outage data. Balance of plant system failures more
frequendy impacted generation capability but had a smaller impact with each failure.
The EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) system failures were dominated by piping failures
and control system instabilities. The large generation loss attributed to Main Steam system
failures was the result of diree Main Steam Relief valve maintenance shutdowns. This weak
component obviously poses a high risk to efficient operation. The Recirc (Recirculation) system
grouping failures were characterized by control system instabilities, age related failures and
maintenance failures. Details of other LGS system failures can readily be found in Appendix 8
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Figure 12. Lost Generation by System and Occurrence, Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station Units 2 and 3
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then length of outage.
Periods of reduced generation capability were analyzed at PBAPS in a similar manner.
Figure 12 provides a similar comparison of the lost generation by the initiating failed system.
Again at Peach Bottom the vast majority of the reductions in generation were initiated by a
Balance of Plant system failures (60° o vs. 35%). The site experienced numerous outages to
repair mechanical problems with the Feedwater (FW) system as noted by the frequent
occurrence ofFW events. It is also noted that Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and
Containment experienced one failure in each system which required a shutdown and
containment entry for repairs. The large impact of a single significant failure is noted by the
disparity of the lost power to frequency of occurrence.
3.3 Consistency of System Failures BWR/4 Fleet versus PECO Plants
As a final comparison it was desired to compare the system failure results found at the
PECO plants with the broader NRC BWR/4 data base. To perform this comparison the PECO
data bases had to be reduced to only contain forced outage events, those removing the generator
from service. The cumulative days of forced outage noted in each of the studies is presented in
Table 2. Note that only those systems accounting for greater than 2% of the total lost capacity in
one of the three groupings is reported. All showed a significant effect of Balance of Plant failures
on plant availability causing the significant majority of unavailability periods. Additionally all data
bases demonstrated the difference in the relative impact of a Reactor/safety related failure as
compared to the Balance of plant system failures.
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Table 2. Cummulativc days of forced outage attributed to each sydstem
NRC ALL BWR DATA PBAPS FORCED OUTAGE DATA LGS FORCED OUTAGE DATA
5 5 yrs, 19 plants 1/92 to 6/97 5 yrs 7/92 to 6/97 5 yrs 1/92 to 12/96
Days outage Days Outage Days Outage
System Total %Total Unit 2 U nit 3 Total % Total Unit 1 Unit 2 Total % Total
Main Turbine 188 7 13.9 0.0 50 50 3.0 03 0.3 06 06
EHC 112.1 83 15.0 00 150 92 5 1 195 24 5 20.8
FW 105.2 78 00 7.1 7.1 43 0.6 31 3.7 3 1
Diesel 104 7 7.7 00 0.0 00 00 0.0 00 00 00
Electrical 57.7 4.3 89 3.6 125 76 64 3.0 9.3 79
Generator 42.3 3.1 9.3 59 152 92 0.0 32 32 2.7
SWC 34.4 25 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 2.4 2.7 5.1 4.3
Condenser 31.1 2.3 0.0 05 0.5 0.3 0.0 50 50 42
FW heating 23.6 1.7 7.9 00 7.9 48 03 07 1.0 0.7
Air Removal 21 4 1.6 00 00 0.0 00 6.5 10 7.5 56
Condensate 16.8 1.2 143 0.0 143 8.7 0.7 3.7 4.4 32
Offgas 04 00 1.2 0.9 132 80 1.2 0.0 1.2 10
BOP sub tot 801.7 59.1 56.7 22.9 90.6 55.1 23.5 42.1 65.5 50.9
Recirc 1226 90 13.1 54 185 11.3 1.2 80 92 78
Reactor 877 6.5 0.0 127 127 7.7 13.0 00 130 11.0
Operation 608 45 0.0 00 00 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 00
Main Steam 575 42 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 21.3 1.1 22.4 190
RPS 407 3.0 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 23
Drywell 32.2 24 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 46 00 46 39
Containment 29.2 22 0.0 13.0 130 7.9 0.0 0.0 00 0.0
DC 10.6 08 00 4.1 4.1 25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LPCI 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.1 14.1 86 0.0 00 0.0 0.0
Reactor sub tot 510.3 37.6 13.1 49.3 62.4 38.0 42.8 9.1 51.9 45.1
Transmission 429 32 2.2 90 11.3 6.9 1.6 3.1 4.7 40







Figure 13. Comparison, Fraction of five year forced outage hours attributed to each system,
Limerick Units 1 and 2, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 and average BWR/4 industry data
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Figure 13 contrasts the relative days of forced outage between the two Limerick units,
the two Peach Bottom units and the BWR/4 utility average, the data of Table 2. The specific
plant data appear spiked in comparison to the slowly varying BWR/4 data. This spiked
appearance demonstrates that individual plants experience only a small portion of the problems
experienced by the broader industry. Table 3 presents the statistical attributes of the forced
outage data. This table only presents those 14 systems which contributed to greater than 2% of
the total lost generation and was generated solely with the NRC data over a 5 xh year period to
cover both of the five year PECO studies. The data represents the rate with which each of the
19 plants encountered forced outages as the result of the indicated system failures. For example,
in the 5.5 year BWR/4 study 14% of the forced outages were the result of Main Turbine system
failures. This system accounted for 18.8 0/o of the total outage days as modified by the 30 day cap.
The mean number of Main Turbine related forced outages per plant for the 5.5 years of the
study was 1.8 and the mean total number of days of forced outage that a plant experienced
during the study as a result of Main Turbine failures was 13.4 days. Note that in every category
the standard deviation of the distribution was greater than the mean. This implies a very
irregular distribution.
Figure 14 has been constructed to provide a visual image of the probability with which a
given system will cause a forced outage. The horizontal axis is the system listing, the axis out of
Table 3. Statistical nature of system failures causing forced outages at each of 19 BWR/4
plants over the 5.5 yr. study
Frequency of Occurrence Accumulated lost davs
% total
% total modrfed
System occurrence Mean Median Mode Min Max Stdev lost days Mean Median Min Max StDev
Main Turbine 14.5 18 1 1 10 2.3 188 13.4 2.1 151.7 35.7
EHC 132 1.6 1 8 2.1 8.3 5.9 2.7 20.7 7.1
FW 8 5 1.1 1 3 1.0 7.8 5.5 2.9 20.8 6.7
Diesel 2.1 0.3 1 0.5 73.3 52.4 00 3891 123.8
Generator 6.0 0.7 3 0.9 3.1 2.2 0.0 7.7 2.9
Electrical 4.7 0.6 2 0.7 4.3 3 242 5.8
SWC 34 04 3 08 2 5 18 0.0 25.3 5 7
Condenser 3 8 0.5 3 0.8 2.3 16 84 2.8
Reel re 72 0.9 1 3 1.0 9 65 1.8 361 10.1
Reactor 3.4 0.4 3 08 6.7 4.8 0.0 33.6 9.1
Main Steam 3.8 5 3 10 4.2 3.0 24.4 7.4
Operation 0.9 0.1 1 3 237.6 1697 0.0 1825.0 513.2
Drywell 21 0.3 1 0.5 24 1.7 14.7 3.6
Containment 0.9 0.1 1 0.3 2.2 1.5 0.0 25.4 58
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the paper is the number of failures reported by a plant for that system in the study, the vertical
axis is the number of plants which reported the given number of failures of the given system
during the study. All of the columns should add up to 19 in the depth direction, as there were 19
plants in the study. ITie more frequent that failuresj&e at all plants, the more forward the
columns should move. The more consistently a given failure occurs in the industry, the more
even all columns in a given number of failures are. If the average plant experienced one forced
outage per year from a given system then the five outages column would register nineteen plants,
as the study covered a five year period. It is observed that most of the columns crowd the back
wall. This means that most of the plants did not experience any forced outages from these
systems. The system with the worst track record will be explained to ensure that the chart is
understood. For the Main Turbine system, five plants did not experience a forced outage as the
result of the system during the study, six plants experienced one forced outage, three plants
experienced two forced outages, four plants experienced three forced outages and one plant
experienced ten forced outages (six or more category on the plot). The most frequent forced
outage rate of one indicates that it is most likely for the Main turbine to cause one forced outage








Figure 14. Failure profile number of plants with a given number of failures of
given systems in the five year study
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Figure 15 has been constructed in a similar manner using the total number of days of
forced outage accumulated by each plant for the given system during the study vice the
frequency. The histogram bins have been laid out in five day increments. The back wall should
be identical to Figure 14 as it represents the number of plants which did not experience any
forced outages from that system for the full study. This figure uses the unmodified data, that is
the outages have not been truncated to 30 days. Note that if one plant experienced greater than
45 days of forced outage it is represented by the histogram bars in the foreground. This is the
grouping that takes up all of the extra long outages. The first column away from the back wall
represents all those plants which experienced from to 5 hours of forced outage as the result of
the indicated system failure during the study. The likelihood of large cumulative outage impacts
from a single weak system is noted to be small while the likelihood that many systems will
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Figure 15. Frequency of total forced outage days by plant and system failure
Figures 14 and 15 can provide significant insight to the likelihood of a given system to
initiate a forced outage. Recall that both of these histograms have their systems presented in a
descending order of cumulative lost capacity attributed to the system. Additionally Balance of
Plant systems have all been grouped together and then Reactor/safety systems, see Figure 10.
Balance of Plant systems are therefore represented by the first 8 columns from the left edge of
Figures 14 and 15. Note that while the cumulative impact of individual BOP systems is
descending as the columns go to the right, in each case four to six plants reported one forced
outage from each of these systems during the entire study. This equates to a 25% probability of
a single forced outage occurring from each of the BOP systems in five and a half years. It is also
observed that these had nearly the same probability of causing a total loss of to 5 days of
forced outage. This can be taken as the generic minor outage. The FW and EHC systems are
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observed to be more problematic. Figure 15 shows plants experiencing a fairly constant, slowly
decreasing distribution of greater cumulative forced outage from these systems. In example, for
the feed water system, 7 plants did not experience a forced outage, 4 plants experienced from -
5 days of outage, 3 plants experiencing from 5-10 days of outage, 2 plants 10-15 days, 2 plants
15-20 days and one plant 20-25 days of outage. These poorly performing BOP systems have
comparable likelihood for two and three forced outages in the 5 year period of the study. In
summary from Figures 14 and 1 5 it is observed that each of the eight balance of plant systems
which have historically generated forced outages present a 25° 'o likelihood of causing a single
forced outage of less than five days in a five year operating period. Three BOP systems pose a
greater risk with diminishing likelihood of causing more forced outages and consuming a
commensurately increased amount of generation capability.
Reactor/safety related systems are noted to present a significantly different forced outage
relationship in Figures 1 4 and 1 5. Note that as the cumulative forced outage time initiated by
each system failure decreases, see Figure 10, so does the likelihood of failure, Figure 14. The
probability of longer outages is greater than that observed for the BOP systems, and the


















Figure 16. Estimated probability of mean
system at mean plant to induce given number
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Figure 17. Estimated probability of mean
system at mean plant to cause given number
of hours of forced outage in 5.5 years
34
is the recirc system which could be considered to have many of the attributes of a BOP system.
Figures 16 demonstrates the estimated probability of the mean system to produce one or
more forced outages during the five and a half year study at the mean plant The estimated
probability of failure is the number of failure events experienced in a given system divided by the
total number of events. Note the high probability for a low failure rate and the rapidly
diminishing probability for multiple forced outages from a single system during the study.
Figure 17 demonstrates the estimated probability of the mean system to initiate a given number
of hours of forced outage during the five and a half year study at the mean plant. Again the
highest probability of greater than 60% is for the mean system not to contribute at all to the
forced outage losses. The probability diminishes rapidly as the window of total forced outage
from a particular system increases. These two curves demonstrate the difficulty with using plant
history to improve performance. The greatest likelihood is for different systems to produce
forced outages of fairly short duration. This is observed by the high probability of any system
not to fail and the small probability for single or double failures during the course of the study,
Figure 16, and by the dominance of the short time period of outage by system, Figure 17.
As the plant systems improve in reliability, there will be fewer plant failures, and
therefore individual system failures will become more infrequent. As fewer failures happen at an
individual plant they must use broader sources of failure data to understand plant vulnerabilities
to determine whether they are immune from the failures experienced by others or whether they
could experience the same failure and should modify their system. For example, neither PECO
Generating Stations experienced any diesel related outages, yet that system has a significant
portion of the industry data. Limerick is unique from most of the industry regarding this system
as they have eight independent diesels. Peach Bottom is not unique with only four diesels. As a
further example, it is noted that there are significant forced outages attributed to the Main
Turbine in the industry data but that this system caused few outages at both Limerick and Peach
Bottom. There were 34 industry wide forced outages attributed to the Main Turbine. The
failures were predominately mechanical failures and vibration problems. It is possible that there
are enough differences between the turbines to explain the inconsistency. It is possible that the
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time of failure in life is vastly different and that Limericks turbines have not experienced wear
out yet It is also possible that the failures are infrequent enough that Limerick just has not yet
experienced them during this analysis window. In any case it would be beneficial to investigate
the failures observed at other utilities and apply the lessons learned from those plants to improve
the reliability of the Limerick System against the possible future failure. While a utility is well
aware of their past failures and weaknesses, these plots imply that they must use larger data bases
to understand the potential future weaknesses of their systems.
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4. Causal Analysis of System Failure
The goal of this study was to qualitatively understand the nature of system failures which
led to a plant forced outage. The characteristics of failure to study were chosen in a manner that
would answer the two basic questions of this research; whether the present system reliability
could support extended operating q^cles and whether utilities could improve overall plant
performance? To examine the first question all system failures were placed into one of six
categories which best descried the root cause of the failure in an equipment centered reference.
This analysis assumes that there are a limited number of basic reasons that any component
unexpectedly fails. The second analysis focused at answering the question ofhow utilities could
improve performance. This analysis was a deeper root cause analysis of failures which assessed
each system failure resulting in lost plant generation capacity as the result of either a human
failure or an equipment failure. The human failures were seen as functions of how personnel do
their daily jobs while equipment related failures were inherent to the equipment design or its
present maintenance system.
The data used for both analyses in this section was the detailed data taken from the four
PECO plants. This data included all periods of 10% or greater reduction in generation over the
five year study. The assessment of the root cause was very qualitative and required the ability to
interview the system engineers and management staffwho corrected the failure. The NRC
records alone were not found to be sufficient to make these judgments for the broader BWR/4
data.
4.1 Equipment centered failure analysis
This first equipment centered failure analysis did not attempt to assess why a failure was
allowed to happen but just the basic nature of the failure. All equipment failures which resulted
in a reduction of generation capacity were placed into one of the following six categories:
Age - the component which failed had passed the end of its useful service life. Failures
included worn parts, leaking seals, drifted set points, electronic card failures and
clogged tubes.
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Design - component failure was the result of an inherently flawed design. The system
failed with all components operating as designed in the application for which it
was installed Failures in this category included control system instabilities,
steam relief valve (SRV) seat leakage, spurious instrumentation signals and filter
clogging.
Fabrication - the component failure can be traced back to an original fabrication flaw.
The component was not constructed to the required design specifications.
Failures in this category included reactor fuel failures, valve failures and the
failure of recendy installed electrical components.
Installation - the component failed as the result of a faulty installation in the system.
Only one failure was noted in this category as the result of foreign material left in
a fluid system.
Maintenance - the component failed as the result of inadequate corrective or
preventative maintenance. Failures in this category included weld failures,
incorrectly assembled components and foreign material left in a system during
maintenance.
Operation - the component was operated outside of its designed range ofperformance
and therefore induced a plant failure. Failures in this category included operator
error, procedural non-compliance, bumped actuators, the use of equipment
which had already exceeded a maintenance threshold (Le. continuing to operate
a pump with an alarming vibration sensor).
The cumulative lost generation attributed to each of these component failure causes is
presented in Table 4. The table has been broken down into three major column sections by
each of the PECO sites and then the aggregate for the four PECO units as a whole. Each major
column is then broken down by Balance of Plant systems, Reactor systems and the aggregate for
that category at that site or column grouping. Note that total includes transmission system
failures in addition to BOP and Reactor. As contrasted to the system failure inconsistencies
presented in the last chapter, it appears that the cumulative failure attributes between each of the
Table 4. Percentage of lost generation capacity attributed to six failure causes
LGS PBAPS PECO
BOP Reactor Total BOP Reactor Total BOP Reactor Total
Age 26 5 16 22 21 20 24 14 19
Design 39 18 29 36 24 29 37 21 29
Fabrication 22 10 7 4 5 9 6
Installation 10 6 1 1 5 3
Maintenance 9 11 13 18 31 27 15 23 21
Operation 15 44 27 16 23 19 15 32 22
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PECO sites is consistent and that one can therefore draw conclusions from the larger data set of
the cumulative PECO data
Component age related failures account for one fifth of the total lost generation
capability. This represents the risk that component wear out poses in the current operating and
maintenance cycle system. It is noted that the Balance of Plant systems have a seventy percent
greater chance than do reactor systems (24% versus 14%) of encountering an age related failure
which impacts generation capability. This is as one would expect with the increased
maintenance standards of the Reactor systems. It is additionally noted that the overall risk posed
by age related failures is relatively small in comparison to the other failure mechanisms. Prior to
extending the maintenance cycle of a component or system this risk should be below an
acceptable level The maintenance cycle can then be cautiously extended based on post
acquisition operating data. This process is referred to as age exploration by the Naval
Maintenance Command6 with regard to the extension of shipboard maintenance cycles. There is
not a direct correlation between a components major maintenance cycle and the plants operating
cycle. In example, a pump seal which was not examined during the last plant major maintenance
period could wear out during use indicating operation of the component past its useful age but
not excessive plant operating cycle length. If a system were not experiencing any age related
component failures then the process of age exploration could be started. If a component is
experiencing age related failures then alternative maintenance strategies may be developed such
as online maintenance which do not impact the plant operating cycle.
The common failure attribute ofweak component design was surprisingly found to be
dominant. Some design issues are long standing and difficult to resolve such as the rapid seat
erosion of SRVs. Balance of Plant design issues were found to be much simpler in nature and
much more prevalent Control systems instabilities were numerous in which spurious signals
propagated to the controllers resulting in unstable response of the system and an eventual plant
trip. Many of these problems were simple to resolve with minor alterations to the sensor or
6 Naval Sea Systems Command, SEA 915, Age Reliability Analysis Prototype Study , October 21, 1993 prepared by Amencan
Management Systems, Inc pursuant to Contract N00024-92-C^4-160
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controller systems. Another common failure mode in this category was piping rupture due to
equipment vibration. The system reliability was easily improved by isolating the vibration from
the piping. The Balance of Plant systems seem to be inherently flawed in that they were not
designed with adequately high standards for the continuity ofpower generation. The
improvement of these inherent weaknesses is a good challenge for the engineering staffs and
presents a very quantifiable problem with identifiable corrective actions. The majority of these
design related failures can be eliminated through the conscientious review of system design and
the addition of greater reliability to essential control processes.
The overall impact of fabrication and installation related failures are negligible. This
would be expected with the high quality equipment procured and with the stringent test
programs on initial plant start up. Three events did cause significant impact on the individual
plants within these categories. LGS experienced a 13 day forced outage to replace leaking fuel.
The fuel failure was categorized as a fabrication failure. LGS also had a four day shut down to
repair a leaking steam jet air ejector as a result of improper installation. PBAPS experienced two
fabrication related shutdowns. A turbine control valve stem separated resulting in a 5 day
shutdown and the generator experienced a lock out as the result of a poor solder joint on a
circuit card resulting in a 3 day outage. Improvements to the installation category are effected by
overall maintenance controls while fabrication defects must be overcome by procurement
procedures. The low overall impact of these two categories reflect the high standards in both
categories.
Maintenance related failures accounted for one fifth of the lost generation during the
study. This represents the risk that working a component will cause a subsequent failure not
prevent it Note that the risk ofcomponent wear out from age related effects is identical to the
risk of maintenance failure. This reflects the complex nature of maintenance and the probability
that while it is performed to theoretically restore a component to design specification, it may do
harm instead. It is noted that the reactor systems are characteristically more complex and they
have fifty percent more maintenance failures. Much work has been done in this area and it is
understood that the industry works very hard to minimize this effect The undedying message is
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that as much effort should be spent by PECO to efaunate unnecessary marntenance on
satisfactorily performing components at these plants as is spent to rmprove the maintenance
efforts on those components which are experiencing age related failures.
TTae operations category drrecdy reflects the complex nature of nuclear power plan,
equrpment operation. He majority of these fates were the result of the non-procedural
operation of equrpment It rs noted mat the more complex reactor systems had twice as many
farlures. litis category represents the greatest challenge to ehntination. It rs very difficult to
make complex systems easy to operate by a diverse group of people in drverse operating
srtuations. Human factors engineering efforts should be able to dramatically affect this failure
cause.
In summary, the component failure causes noted at the PECO plants during the five
year study reflect great potential for improvement by dedicated engineering actions. The
categories of age, design and maintenance related failures represent 60% of the total lost power.
Many of these failure methods can be easily prevented through the careful analysis of system
design, reliability and the cautious exploration ofimproved maintenance methods. The operator
related component failures, which also can be affected through improved engineenng design,
represent a greater challenge due to the uncertain human factor. The risk posed on component
failure by maintenance penodicity and therefore indirectly operating cycle length is no greater
than the risk posed by maintenance failure. It is predicted that the installed equipment can
support a cautious increase in operating cycle length. The complete list ofPECO reductions in
generation capacity have been sorted by component failure cause and are presented as Appendix
10 for Limerick and Appendix 1 1 for Peach Bottom for further review.
4.2 Failure Root Cause Analysis
In order to determine the focus of efforts needed to improve power plant capability a
summary was created of the root causes of system failures which initiated periods of reduced
capacity. The root cause was determined by reviewing root cause analysis records at the power
plants and by interviewing engineering and management staff. All failures were initially classified
as either those which were the result of inherent equipment factors or failures that were the
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poor corrective maintenance - repeat failures of a worked component
management standards - management decision to operate with known degraded
equipment
less than adequate corrective action - repeat failure as the root cause of original
failure was not propedy diagnosed
It is noted from Table 5 that approximately half of the total lost generation capacity at
each of the PECO sites has been attributed to human vs. equipment factors. It is of interest to
note that the original review of the failures yielded that nearly all were the result of equipment
failures. After detailed review with upper management it was determined that many of the
equipment failures were the result ofpersonnel error. This confirms the well known danger of
conducting a root cause analysis with only records. Note that a subcategory could not be
assigned to every failure and the subcategories do not therefore add up to the parent category.
Table 5. Percentage of lost generation capacity attributed to equipment and human factors
LGS PBAPS PECO
BOP Reactor Total BOP Reactor Total BOP Reactor Total
Equipment Factors 51 45 46 69 47 56 61 46 52
Weak Design 27 17 22 39 20 29 34 19 26
Worn Parts 13 7 9 14 10 10 8 9
End of Life 4 9 6 3 5 3
Fatigued Parts 1 1
Instrument Control System
Human Factors 49 55 54 31 53 44 39 54 48
Procedural Inadequacy 10 9 9 2 20 10 5 15 10
Craftsmanship 13 8 10 4 2 3 7 4 6
Operator Action 4 11 7 15 23 17 11 18 13
Poor Corrective Maintenance 2 1 10 10 7 7
Management Standards 24 10 10 4
Less than adequate Corr. Action 13 4 8 5 2 3
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The greater weakness of the Balance of Plant designs is again noted by the 80% increase
in the weak design root cause of failure. The complexity of the Reactor/ safety systems is also
noted in the increase in procedural and operator failures. The management standards category
was created to account for the times when engineering staff advised management of a material
condition degradation for which a shutdown was required to repair but management chose to
risk continued operation. This figure does not represent the number of times that management
took the same risk but was successful in making it to the next scheduled maintenance period.
The last category reflects poor troubleshooting of a failure and the restoration ofpower with an
unresolved problem. These last two categories are singular events for which there was rapid
learning.
The relative weight of categories provides insight to changes that could be made in plant
operation to improve capability. The overall categories shed light as to how much change can
be made by engineering equipment modifications versus improved training or monitoring of
personnel. In the case ofPECO both can provide equally promising gains. The complete list of
PECO reductions in generation capacity have been sorted by failure root cause and are
presented as Appendix 12 for Limerick and Appendix 13 for Peach Bottom for further review.
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5. Operating Cycle Analysis
This analysis was conducted to identify common strong and weak periods within the
mean operating cycle. The plant operating cycle is defined as the time period from start up
following a refueling outage until shutdown for the subsequent refueling outage. The power
plant is made up ofmany systems which have many individual components each with unique
maintenance requirements and failure characteristics. While individual components have failure
rates that vary with there time in service since the last major maintenance, it is unclear whether
plant operating cycles have characteristic periods of reduced or improved reliability. Naval ship
system performance studies have found that often the combined effect ofmany components is a
system with a flat failure probability.7 That is the probability of system failure is nearly constant
with time. Common impacts of the plant operating cycle on components could nonetheless
create observable plant operating cycle failure rate characteristics. This section will determine
whether those common failure characteristics exist and if so their probable impact on extending
operating cycles and the capability to improve overall utility performance.
It is understandable that systems may fail at increasing rates as the time since the last
refueling increases. This would be plausible as the continuos operating period since the last
shutdown maintenance is extending. If there are systems or components which can only be
worked during a shutdown period then their system and component age would increase with
operating cycle age. Additionally these same systems will accumulate maintenance warnings or
indications of impending failure as the operating cycle progresses. Many of these warnings force
plant managers to choose between shutting down to repair the system or to continue operating
until the next scheduled shutdown. In the last section the impact of an incorrect decision to
continue operating was demonstrated. These maintenance warnings will inevitably accumulate as
the operating cycle progresses and could adversely affect the mean late operating cycle
performance more adversely than early operating cycle performance.
7 Naval Sea Systems Command, SEA 915, Age Reliability Analysis Prototype Study , October 21, 1993 prepared by American
Management Systems, Inc pursuant to Contract N00024-92-C-4160
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The initial start up period after refueling is seen as another plausible weak performance
period. As the majority of significant system maintenance is conducted during the refueling
outage and each maintenance action carries with it a measured risk of failure on use, this initial
start up period may be a higher risk period of operation. During the shut down period many of
the systems are opened and the state of their contents changed significantly. In example, a steam
system which normally operates at high temperatures and pressures with chemistry controls
could be stagnant with more challenged chemistry controls during a shutdown period The
increased build up of corrosion products could propagate to many other systems after start up.
Shutdown maintenance periods are additionally very congested events with respect to the high
level ofwork done in a compressed time frame and space. It is moire likely that personnel error
will damage nearby systems during these outages and that this damage could result in degraded
plant performance on initial start up.
Mid-cycle could also have degraded performance as the plant managers are more likely
to shutdown the plant to fix a growing list of systems with maintenance warnings. Plant
managers may be inclined to look for an optimal window for an unscheduled mid cycle
maintenance outage as there is still a long period to operate and the problem list is growing. If a
heavy power usage period is on the horizon a staff may decide to shutdown before hand during
a low power demand period and repair all of the systems which have maintenance flags. This
same decision process is less likely near the end of cycle when there is a limited time until the
scheduled major maintenance period commences. Of interest while a plant staffmay try to set
themselves up for the high demand period by maintaining systems, they may actually degrade
performance by creating a new high failure period following the maintenance. Recall that the
last section demonstrated an equal probability of failure from maintenance as from component
wear out
Transient periods may additionally cause higher failure rates. It is plausible that the plant
dynamics of starting up, shutting down or significantly changing power may impact operational




Three basic analysis methods were constructed to observe these potential operating cycle
characteristics. The first study is an analysis of forced outage events as a function of the time in a
plant's operating cycle at which they occur. This study only recognizes forced outage event
records and is therefore a reflection of plant capability and is very coarse in its time sensitivity.
The second study is an analysis of the daily power generation records as a function of the time in
a plants operating cycle. This study has the benefit of increased time sensitivity as there are 19
reports per day and it captures all plant events. It could not be used to solely analyze equipment
reliability because operationally necessary reductions in power are indistinguishable from system
failures. The second study is used to validate the first studies results and to observe the impact
of variables other than equipment reliability on plant performance. The third study observes the
connection of forced outages to other operating cycle events. This study attempts to capture
the observed impact of events such as shutting the plant down for a mid-cycle outage.
5.2 Forced Outage Operating Cycle Analysis
The BWR/4 and PECO forced outage data discussed earlier was analyzed as a function
of the time in the individual plant operating cycle when the forced outage occurred. Only
complete operating cycle periods were analyzed to ensure that all portions of a cycle were equally
weighted. From 19 BWR/4 plants, 40 complete operating cycles were obtained. Two of these
operating cycles had long technical requirement shutdowns and were therefore excluded from
the study as they were not representative of cyclic plant performance. Had they not been
excluded a method would have been necessary to incorporate the excessively long remaining
cycle with the other 'normal' cycles. The two excluded cycles are shown in Figure 18. The
maximum outage limitation of thirty days from earlier studies was removed. The constraints that
the cycle be complete, not be involved in a lengthy administrative shutdown and have a normal
length removed the excessive shutdowns from the study. The worst of the cycles included in the
study are provided in Figure 1 9.
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Figure 1 8. Excluded operating cycles
Two constructions of the data were created. In the first forward looking construction,
all of the outages were analyzed by the day in the operating cycle that the outage occurred. To
understand this method, it is helpful to imagine stacking all of the operating cycles on top of
each other with the same operating cycle day x-axis. This analysis was the most revealing of early
cycle failure attributes and failures direcdy associated with days in service. It is less useful for the
analysis of end of cycle performance as shorter cycles are continually dropping offline. If the
mean cycle performance was improving at the 700 day mark it cannot be determined whether
that is the effect of shorter poody performing cycles dropping out or longer cycles improving in
performance. The second backward looking construction was therefore made to better
understand how the mean cycle is completed. All cycles were stacked up on the same cycle end
date and then backed up to the cycle start. In this view plants will start at different points and all
end at the same point. If the mean operating cycle has difficulty completing this would be
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apparent as a downward trend at the common end point. By combining these two constructions
one should be able to understand how the average cycle is executed with regard to its engineered
length.
Unit 341, Fermi 2, Op period 11/7/92- 3/12/94 (490 d)
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Figure 19. Worst operating cycles included in BWR/4 analysis
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5.2. 1 Forward looking forced outage operating cycle analysis
A histogram bin was created for each 30 day period within the operating cycle and is
shown as Figure 20. The clear columns represent the number of cycles in the analysis for each 30
day period, as read on the right vertical axes. Note that all 38 plants are in cycle until shortly after
the first year when plants start to finish their operating cycles. The analysis was terminated at
700 days to ensure that there were still sufficient operating cycles remaining, six, to obtain a
meaningful average. The blue columns represent the average occurrences per month as read on
the left vertical scale. The red columns represent the average lost days per month as read on the
same scale. Red and blue sixth order fitted curves of the monthly data have been added to aid
visual trending of the data.
The mean frequency of forced outage occurrences is noted to be fairly constant with the
exception of the first operating cycle month which exhibits twice as many failures as the second
month or the mean frequency of occurrence (0.67 outages during the first month versus 0.29
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Figure 20. BWR/4 Operating cycle analysis of forced outage data
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failures are observed to only impact the first month of operation. There are 3.8 days lost in the
first month of the mean cycle as compared to 1.42 days during the second month of the mean
cycle or 1.33 days for the mean of all 30 day periods. While measurable this is a very small early
cycle failure probability. It is also observed that the mean outage length during the first month
of 5.75 days is consistent with the mean outage length for any month of 5.78 days. The period
from the second month to 390 days is observed to exhibit a very consistent rate of lost days per
month frequency of outage. From 390 days until 570 days it is observed that significant forced
outages are experienced. This is during the same period that many shorter cycles are completing.
The day 405 centered 30 day period increase in days lost is primarily the result of a main turbine
failure at 414 days of operation. The refueling outage was then started 78 days later. This failure
defined the end of the operating cycle as the plant was unrecoverable. The 435 day centered
period is dominated by another main turbine failure at day 422. This failure resulted in a 50 day
outage after which the plant did operate for 26 days before refueling. The 555 day centered
period is composed of five system failures after all ofwhich the plants returned to power.
5.2.2 Comparison ofPECO sites to BWR/4 operating cycleperformance
The BWR/4 forced outage operating cycle data was compared to individual PECO site
data to observe the effect that different operating teams can have on plant performance. Figure
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Figure 21. Comparison of average days of forced outage by operating cycle
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fitted curves have again been added to aid in analysis. It is observed that LGS and PBAPS have
dramatically opposing operating cycle performance. The LGS data was the average of four
cycles and the PBAPS data was the average of five cycles. Close inspection of the individual
cycles revealed that the observed average performance was characteristic of each cycle at the
particular site. LGS repeatedly came out of the refueling experiencing little forced outage early
on but had difficulty with end of cycle performance. PBAPS had difficulty early on but
completed the cycle with very little forced outage.
To fully understand the unique site characteristics the frequency of forced outages were
compared in a similar manner as seen in Figure 22. It is observed that LGS and PBAPS have
nearly identical early cycle forced outage frequencies while PBAPS was observed to have much
greater early cycle days of forced outage in Figure 21 . This means that the PBAPS early cycle
outages are of significantly greater length than LGS outages. PBAPS plant management noted
that minor eady cycle failures were dramatically amplified by the failure of older nuclear
instrumentation that would not support a rapid restoration of power. To reduce the mean
shutdown time experienced, this older equipment has been replaced with more reliable
instrumentation which will allow a more rapid restoration of power.
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Figure 22. Comparison of occurrences of forced outages by time in operating cycle
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later half of the mean cycle. While each site had excellent leadership, small differences in there
management philosophies were observed which may have contributed to this observed
difference. LGS had a very strict execution of their refueling plan. It was very difficult to add
new work to the refueling with a strong bias towards deferring repair of new failures until the
next scheduled outage. PBAPS management had a philosophy which opted more towards
immediate correction of newly discovered problems. PBAPS' tendency to promptly correct
discovered failures may have established a greater level of reliability and therefore ability to
support the complete operating cycle. It is possible that the stricter compliance ofLGS with the
refueling maintenance plan resulted in a higher quality of maintenance that was conducted but
with more systems operating with marginal performance.
5.2.3 Backward lookingjorced outage operating cycle analysis
To observe the end of cycle effects Figure 23 was constructed which lays out the outage
events in 30 day bins from the end of cycle backwards. The number of plants in cycle are noted
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Figure 23. BWR/4 operating cycle analysis of forced outage events back from end of cycle
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operating cycle regardless of their individual length. It is observed that the period three months
prior to the end of cycle has a significant increase in average forced outage. This may partially be
a wall effect of the end of cycle. If a significant forced outage, main turbine failure, is
experienced three months prior to the end of the cycle a three month outage will be realized. If
the same failure is experienced one month prior to the end of cycle only one month will be
realized. Overall the plants do exhibit an observable end of cycle degradation in reliability
centered 100 days prior to the end of cycle. This effect is noted to be greater than the early cycle
failures. The ramp in average days lost early in the cycle reflects the infrequent nature of failures
during this good performance period. The number of plants in cycle is steadily decreasing
greater than 400 days before the end of cycle. The denominator used to calculate the average
days of forced outage is therefore decreasing causing the average days of outage to
proportionally increase.
5.2.4 Cumulative impact offorced outages
To better answer the question of whether observed performance supports operating
cycle extension the cumulative capability factor as derived from the BWR/4 30 day forced
outage data presented above was plotted in Figure 24. The blue points represent the mean
capability factor determined from the BWR/4 forced outage data for each operating cycle
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Figure 24. BWR/4 cumulative capability factor
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generated. The dashed brown line is a sixth order fitted curve to the monthly capability data.
The effects of the early cycle reduced capability experienced during the first month of operation
and the reduced capability near day 500 can be observed. The red line is a connection of the
discrete monthly cumulative capability factor derived from the monthly capability points. The
cumulative function is noted to be self damping not quickly responding the periods of reduced
or improved performance. The solid black line is a third order fitted curve to the cumulative
capability' factor.
It is observed that the cumulative capability is nearly constant at slightly over 95% after
300 days of operation. The weak period near day 500 is balanced by the stronger performing
months before and after. The observed cumulative capability is encouraging for operating cycle
extensions as a downward trend in operating cycle capability is not observed with increasing
length.
5.3 Daily Generation Operating Cycle Analysis
This second analysis was conducted by examining the mean daily generation reports
from each of the BWR/4 plants in a stacked operating cycle manner similar to the previous
forced outage operating cycle analysis. The results of this analysis can be used to verify the
previous results as an independent source of data was used. Additionally this analysis can be
used to observe the impact of operational events other than forced outages on cycle
performance. Lastly this data base offers much greater sensitivity as each plant has a data point
for each day in the operating cycle.
The average daily net electrical generation was obtained from the digital NRC data base
maintained by INEEL as discussed in section 2. The daily data was modified such that the
maximum power generated during a single cycle was established as 100% generation capacity.
This removed reporting inconsistencies between plants and allowed an even handed
comparison. The same cycles were analyzed as discussed above for the forced outage operating
cycle analysis. Figure 25 presents the mean generation capacity by day in operating cycle for the
38 cycles analyzed. The solid green line represents the plants in cycle for a given operating cycle
day. The blue points are the daily mean capacity of the all plants for the given operating cycle
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day. ITic red line is a moving 21 day average of the daily mean capacity. The first seven days of
mean capacity produce a linear power ramp up. This is attributed to the careful process of power
accession and required testing following the refueling outage. The moving data average
therefore did not include these points as they would bias the random process following day
seven. The red line prior to day seven is just the daily mean for the first seven days. The 21 day
average also expanded from the eighth day such there would not be any early cycle bias. Day
nine was a three day average, day 10 a five day average until a 21 day average was established by
day 1 8. The ending mean was tapered down in a similar manner. It can be observed from
Figure 25 that the moving average closely follows the daily means. The cyclic nature of the mean
capacity factor demonstrates the impact of individual forced outages. The solid black line is a
smoothed curve of the moving average from day seven on such that start up effects do not bias
the curve.
BWRs historically coastdown at the end of their operating cycle. During coastdown the
net electrical generation is limited by the declining reactivity of the fuel. Coastdown pulls the
mean daily operating cycle capacity down to 60% by day 700. It is additionally noted that plants
which have been fueled for shorter operating cycles are coasting down earlier. This causes the
large cyclic swings which parallel the cycles in study line. As coasting down plants come offline
the mean moves up to the remaining plants not yet coasting down. Prior to day 300 the mean
100%
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capacity is noted to slowly build from day 7 to a gentle maximum at approximately day 1 50.
Figure 25 demonstrates little with regard to plant reliability late in the operating cycle due to the
dominant effects of fuel coast down. To remove this effect the coastdown period was modified
to reflect the generation capability as limited by fuel reactivity.
Figure 26 provides the coastdown modified mean operating cycle capacity. The daily
modified capacity is observed to be nearly flat over the entire operating cycle. The gradual
increase in daily capacity from 85% at day 7 to 93% at day 200 is observed as before with the raw
data. The end of cycle performance is noted to be similar to that from the forced outage records.
A broad dip is noted for 100 days on either side of day 500. The modified capacity drops from
93% to 89%. The last one hundred days of operating cycles analyzed demonstrate a strong
performance with the daily mean capacity increasing to 95%. The cumulative impact of the daily
modified capacity is illustrated in Figure 27. It is observed that the cumulative capacity slowly
increases from 85% at day 7 to 92% at day 300. The adjusted cumulative capacity is then
observed to be flat at 92% from day 300 on to the end of the analysis. The cumulative function
balances the bimodal nature of the daily mean capacity. The modified daily capacity which
accounts for all operating cycle events such as planned maintenance outages and on line
maintenance demonstrates strong end of operating cycle performance. This result supports the
100 600 700200 300 400 500
Day in Operating Cycle
Figure 26. Mean BWR/4 daily operating cycle coastdown modified capacity
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Figure 27. Cumulative BWR/4 daily operating capacity modified for coastdown
exploration of longer operating cycles with regard to plant reliability.
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5.4 Conditional relation of forced outage events upon operating cycle events
The goal of this analysis was to determine whether specific operating cycle events
demonstrated a measured relationship to forced outage events. If these operating cycle events
are detected than their minimization will have positive impacts on plant reliability. Every
reduction in generation capability noted at the PECO plants was analyzed to determine if the
event was the result of a refueling outage shutdown, an operational plant transient or a planned
maintenance outage. Table 6 summarizes the results. Limerick is observed to have a nearly
constant low risk of a follow on loss of generation capacity event as the result of any of the three
operating cycle events identified, refueling, transient or maintenance outage. Peach Bottom was
observed to have a greater risk of follow on events after a refueling or operational transient
This may reflect the management policies toward the execution of the refueling shutdown and
Table 6. Conditional relation of PECO forced unavailability events
LGS PBAPS
Occurrence Lost power Occurrence Lost power
9% 6% 14% 21%
9% 8% 14% 13%






5.5 Operating cycle analysis summary
Two independent analysis methods and records were used to demonstrate that the
cumulative operating cycle performance is flat from the mid-cycle point on to the end of the
mean operating cycle. This supports age exploration toward longer operating qxles. Two
periods of lesser system reliability were noted during the first 150 days of the mean operating
cycle and approximately 75 days from the end of an operating cycle. These degraded equipment
reliability periods were of lesser impact on overall cycle performance than the cycle based
operational demands of initial start up following a refueling and the coast down prior to a
subsequent refueling. If the operating cycle were extended one could realize the reduced impact
of the start up and coast down limitations, and the identified fraction of load reduction
associated with refueling in Table 6. The uniqueness of plant performance was demonstrated
with a comparison of the two PECO BWR/4 sites. It is possible that sites could improve weaker
operating cycle performance areas by understanding the successful management strategies of a
site with opposing strengths.
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6. Plant reliability improvement processes
This section presents the PECO Balance of Plant reliability improvement process that
was studied and supported as part of this cooperative research project. The genesis for this
research was PECO's Limerick Generating Station BOP-700 project so named to attempt to
improve the reliability of the Balance of Plant such that it could support a continuous 700 day
operating period (the maximum period attainable with the current fuel cycle). From the
definition statement of this program, the site management understood the relative weakness of
the BOP systems and felt that they failed with increasing probability as operating cycle length
increased. From sections 3 and 5, these assumptions are noted to be correct for LGS. To
improve BOP reliability, systems which could effect plant reliability as shown by this research
were prioritized to be studied by Focus on Improvement Teams (FITs). The FIT process was
conceived to be a proactive process. Significant lessons learned were carried over from recent
reactive Tiger Teams created to correct repetitive system failures. The Tiger Teams had a much
more straight forward task to stop recurring failures of the same components. The shift from a
Tiger Team process to the FIT concept can be seen as an evolutionary process. When
components are failing on a frequent basis it is easy to identify the problem and solutions are
more focused. The existing data bases, NPRDS and EPLX are well suited to provided assistance
for correcting problems for supported components because they are catalogued by failing
component As systems become more reliable, utilities must work harder to find the potential
failure points. This marks a turning point for the industry and may explain the apparent stalling
of the median capability factor noted in Figure 3 of the introduction.
FITs were made up of system managers from both PECO sites, previous system
managers and representatives from Design Engineering, Component Engineering, Operations,
Maintenance, Instrumentation & Controls (I&Q, Health Physics and component vendors when
appropriate. An effort was made to optimize the team dynamics from previous Tiger Team
successes. Mentoring relationships were created such as placing a veteran component engineer
with a less experienced system manager. The teams were gathered for only a short time, such as
three days, to maintain an energetic group process atmosphere.
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The teams reviewed all available records of system and component failures and identified
components with a proven negative impact on plant reliability. System dynamics were also
reviewed in a bottom up manner to find reliability choke points. The teams generated lists of
possible design changes, component improvements or changes to operating procedures. The
suggestions were prioritized by each team. Minor alterations that could be accomplished within
the scope of a routine maintenance period were assigned to the appropriate organization for
implementation. More significant changes requiring a significant capital investment, were
submitted by the appropriate system manager in the form a cost to benefit assessment
Management is presently saddled with a difficult process of implementing these
proposed alterations. By the nature of the system performance, the probable failure of a given
component is very low. If the capital investment is high, it is hard to rationally justify the
expenditure. Note that none of these issues are directly safety related. It is difficult to measure
the level of confidence that recommended alterations will produce a predicted improvement in
reliability or savings of future costs. If management does not allocate significant resources for a
substantial period of time, it is doubtful that the low failure rates will substantially diminish. It is
recommended that utilities set aside a fixed amount of funds in their annual budget process
towards the continued improvement of plant reliability and that these funds be only altered by
long term plant performance.
The FlTs brought together a wide range of experience and focused key personnel on the
issue of a systems reliability. In many cases one member of the team was newly assigned system
responsibilities and learned much of the systems characteristics from the other team members.
PECO expressed an interest in using the same process in the future as part of system manager
turn over. The process also focused more senior levels of management on potential future
problems instead ofon current problems.
The capital assets of a system directly affected the function of the FIT. Large capital
systems such as the Main Turbine or the Turbine Generator are managed in great detail by the
vendor. The vendor has historically recommended modifications and knew the status of each
plant's component The FIT process for these components degenerated to a review of the
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vendors recommended alterations. Unfortunately, capital pieces of equipment tended to have
extraordinarily large costs associated with improving their reliability. In example, many
alterations for the main generator were proposed which involved purchasing a new rotor. In
contrast, the less capital systems such as a support systems in general had no external contact to
the plant For these systems, the FlTs could brain storm and develop inexpensive alterations
that would significantly improve reliability. Examples of these alterations involved the addition
of relay contacts, the altering of control logic and minor alterations to equipment configuration
such as the replacement of a y-strainer in an essential system with a duplex strainer such that a
clogged filter could be cleaned without shutting down the plant The process for both types of
systems were found to be beneficial if for no other reason than the transference of system
knowledge.
The large capital systems have excellent technical support systems maintained by the
vendors as mentioned above. The lesser systems need to have the same ability to utilize a larger
base of knowledge. Informal communication groups have started to develop to aid this process.
INPO has tried to foster their creation through system manager conferences. As many of these
groups are autonomous, they must be able to exist with litde administrative oversight Efforts in
this area could have a significant affect on plant reliability and ease the duties of system managers
who must oversee systems that rarely faiL
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7. Conclusions
The median US nuclear power plant capability factor has recently halted its long standing
upward trend. This is seen as the effect of recent plateaus experienced in efforts to improve
system performance and reduce refueling outage length. In comparing US performance to other
countries performance and small groupings within the US, it is evident that the overall capability
can be improved but only by broadening the community of operational experience.
System mangers need to have access to counterparts at other similar plants to share there
experiences. It is recommended that informal communication networks be established for this
need. Additionally system managers must be able to rapidly access a recorded knowledge base
of system failures. The required NRC reports would easily satisfy this need if better constraints
were placed on the fields all ready required for entry and if all utilities could database search the
record.
Regulatory shutdowns were found to be the dominant source of lost capacity and
warrant further study such that their impact could be minimi2ed. With regard to system
reliability, Balance of Plant systems were found to initiate the vast majority of periods of reduced
generation capability and account for the majority of lost generation in comparison to reactor or
safety related systems. Additionally, Balance of Plant failures were found to have outages of
shorter average length than reactor system failures. AH system failures were noted to be
infrequent occurrences as a result ofgood overall plant performance. The mean system was
found to have a 0.23 probability of failure in five years. It is therefore very difficult to maintain an
adequate understanding of potential system failures unless broader knowledge bases are utilized.
Balance of Plant system failures were found to be dominated by design problems,
indicative of the historical lower requirements for these systems to sustain a single point failure .
Many design problems with these systems were noted to be easily corrected such as controller
and sensor instabilities. Reactor systems failures were predominandy operator related owing to
the complex nature of the systems. Age related component failures were noted to only account
for 20% of the lost capacity. This was equal in magnitude to the percentage of forced outage
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attributed to maintenance failures. This warns against adding on maintenance requirements to
solve age related failures. Instead maintenance requirements should be optimized to lower both
failure causes. The overall causes ofcomponent failure were found to be easily impacted by
engineering solutions.
The root cause analysis conducted of the PECO failures indicated that roughly half of
the lost capacity could be attributed to human failures. Craftsmanship issues were found to be
minor contributors while operator error and procedural adequacy issues were found to be
significant. The greatest use of the root cause analysis is for the utility under study to examine
where emphasis should be placed to improve the overall process at that site.
Several analyses were conducted to observe the performance of the mean BWR/4
operating cycle. Minor periods of reduced capability were noted during the first month and
approximately 75 days from the end of cycle. These periods of reduced performance were
adequately balanced by the remainder of the operating q^cle such that the cumulative operating
cycle capability and capacity were constant after 300 days of operation. The effects of start up
and fuel coast down were found to be ofmuch greater impact on cycle performance. In
addition a small percentage of forced outage events could be traced to the refueling outage.
Extending the operating cycle can not be seen from this analysis to cause a negative reliability
impact but will reduce the impact of all operating cycle dependent effects (start up, coast down).
The observed system improvement process at PECO was found to be highly beneficial
in terms of raising the level of awareness and transferring knowledge. It was more difficult to
directly impact the systems through modification. It is difficult to justify the expenditure of
significant assets towards accomplishment of costly improvements to systems designed to lower
reliability standards.
In answer to the fundamental questions of this research, no impediments are seen
towards extending operating q^cle length. On the contrary, it appears that overall performance
will improve as the impact of cycle dependent loss will be reduced. For utilities to improve their
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Appendix 4. NRC monthly report, glossary of terms
(
DOCKET Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
DOCKETA Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
RPTPERIOD Month and year of reporting period. (MMYY)
UTLCONTCT Utility contact concerning monthly operating data.
FIRSTNAME Contact's first name
UTL_PHONE Contact's phone number.
NAME_RTG Nameplate rating.
DERNET Design electrical rating.
MDC_GROSS Gross maximum dependable capacity.
MDC_NET Net maximum dependable capacity.
CHANGES Changes occuring in ratings or capacities.
PWRRSTRCT Power level to which restricted.
RSTRCTRSN Reason for power level restriction
GBRPTHRS Report period hours
YTD_RPT Year-to-date report period hours.
CUM_RPT Cumulative report period hours.
CRITCOMM Critical hours.
YTD_CRIT Year-to-date critical hours.
CUM_CRIT Cumulative critical hours.
RESHTDHRS Reactor reserve shutdown hours.
YTDRESHlD Year-to-date reactor reserve shutdown hours.
CUM_RESHTD Cumulative reactor reserve shutdown hours.
ONLINE_HRS Generator on-line hours
YTDONLrNE Year-to-date generator on-line hours.
CUM_ONLrNE Cumulative generator on-line hours. g
URESHDHRS Unit reserve shutdown hours ™
YTD_URESHD Year-to-date unit reserve shutdown hours.
CUMJURESHD Cumulative unit reserve shutdown hours.
GROSS_THER Gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
YTD_THER Year-to-date gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
CUM_THER Cumulative gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
GROSSELEC Gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
YTD_G_ELEC Year-to-date gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
CUM_G_ELEC Cumulative gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
NET_ELEC Net electrical energy generated (MWH).
YTDNELEC Year-to-date net electrical energy generated (MWH).
CUM_N_ELEC Cumulative net electrical energy generated (MWH).
SEVICEFAC Unit service factor.
YTDSVFAC Year-to-date unit service factor.
CUM_SV_FAC Cumulative unit service factor.
AVAIL_FAC Unit availability factor.
YTDAVFAC Year-to-date unit availability factor.
CUM_AV_FAC Cumulative unit availability factor.
MDC_CAP Unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
YTD_MDC_CP Year-to-date unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
CUM_MDC_CP Cumulative unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
DER_CAP Unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity factor.
YTD_DER_CP Year-to-date unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity factor
CUM_DER_CP Cumulative unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity factor.










Appendix 4. NRC monthly report, glossary of terms
Year-to-date unit forced outage rate.
Cumulative unit forced outage rate.
Forced outage hours.
Year-to-date forced outage hours.
Cumulative forced outage hours.
Scheduled shutdowns over next six months.
If currently shutdown, estimated startup date.
Monthly operating report notes or comments.
POACOMMTS Not used for Gray Book.
THERMAJLPWR Licensed thermal power.
RPT_HRS Not used for Gray Book.




M0RP2.DBF - Unit Shutdown and Power Reduction
DOCKET Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
RPT_PERIOD Month and year of the reporting period (MMYY).
OUTGSEQ Sequential number assigned to outage
OUTG_DATE Date outage began.
OUTG_TYPE Outage type (forced or scheduled). ForS
OUTG_F£RS Outage duration in hours.
OUTGREASN Outage reason. A = Equipment Failure
B = Maintenance or Test
C = Refueling
D = Regulatory Restriction
E = Operator Training and License Examination
F = Administrative
G = Operational Error
H = Other
OUTG_METH Method of shutting down reactor.
1 = Manual Shutdown
2 = Manual Scram
3 = Automatic Scram
4 = Continuation of Shutdown from previous Month
5 = Power Reduction
9 = Power Hold or Continuation of Shutdown During
same month
OUTGJLER Outage LER Number
OUTG_SYSTM Outage system. I
OUTGCOMP Outage component.
DESCRIP Outage description.
OUTG INDEX Indexing field.
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*
M0RP3 dbf - no longer used, recorded the avg power output (in MW) by a plant over the
previous 24 hour period















The net electrical energy generated during the day
(measured from 0001 to 2400 hours inclusive) in
megawatts hours divided by 24 hours.
The maximum thermal power of the reactor authorized
by the NRC, expressed in megawatts.
Date unit was declared by utility owner to be
available for the regular production of electricity;
usually related to satisfactory completion of
qualification tests as specified in the purchase
contract and to accounting policies and practices
of utility.
The nominal net electrical output of the unit
specified by the utility and used for the purpose
of plant design.
An outage required to be initiated no later than the
weekend following discovery of an offnormal
The clock hours during the report period that a unit
is unavailable due to forced outages.
Electrical output of the unit during the report
period as measured at the output terminals of the






The clock hours from the beginning of a specified
situation until its end. For outage durations, the
clock hours during which the unit is not in power
production.
The thermal energy produced by the unit during the
report period as measured or computed by the licensee
in megawatt hours.
Also, "Unit Service Hours." The total clock hours in
the report period during which the unit operated with
breakers closed to the station bus. These hours
added to the total outage hours experienced by the




in the report period.
For units in power ascension at the end of the period,
the gross hours from the beginning of the period or
the first electrical production, whichever comes last,
whichever comes last, to the end of the period.
For units in commercial operation at the end of the
period, the gross hours from the beginning of the
period or of commercial operation, whichever comes





The total clock hours in the report period during
which the reactor sustained a controlled chain reaction.
MAX DEPENDABLE
CAPACITY GROSS
(MDC GROSS) (GROSS MWe)
Dependable main-unit gross capacity, winter or summer,
whichever is smaller. The dependable capacity varies
because the unit efficiency varies during the year
due to cooling water temperature variations. It is
the gross electrical output as measured at the output
terminals of the turbine generator during the most
restrictive seasonal conditions (usually summer).
MAX DEPENDABLE
CAPACITY NET
(MDC Net) (Net MWe)




The nameplate power designation of the generator
in megavolt amperes (MVA) times the nameplate
rating power factor of the generator. NOTE: The
nameplate rating of the generator may not be
indicative of the maximum dependable capacity, since
some other item of equipment of a lesser rating
(e.g., turbine) may limit unit output.
NET ELEC ENERGY
GENERATED
Gross electrical output of the unit measured at the
output terminals of the turbine generator during the
reporting period, minus the normal station service
electrical energy utilization. If this quantity is
less than zero, a negative number should be recorded.
OUTAGE A situation in which no electrical production takes
place.
OUTAGE DATE As reported on Appendix D of Reg. Guide 1.16, the date
of the start of the outage. If continued from a
previous month, report the same outage date but change
"Method of Shutting Down Reactor" to "4 (continuations)"
and add a note: "Continuation from previous month."
OUTAGE DURATION The total clock hours of the outage measured from
the beginning of the report period or the outage,
118 i
whichever comes last, to the end of the report period
or the outage, whichever comes first.
I
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OUTAGE NUMBER A number unique to the outage assigned by the
licensee. The same number is reported each month
in which the outage is in progress. One format is




See "Hours in Reporting Period."
A reduction in the Average Daily Power Level of more
than 20% from the previous day. All power reductions
are defined as outages ofzero hours duration for the
purpose of computing unit service and availability
factors, and forced outage rate.
REACTOR AVAILABLE
HOURS
The total clock hours in the report period during
which the reactor was critical or was capable of
being made critical. (Reactor Reserve Shutdown
Hours + Hours Reactor Critical.)
REACTOR AVAILABILITY
FACTOR




The cessation of criticality in the reactor for
administrative or other similar reasons when operation





The total clock hours in the report period that the
reactor is in reserve shutdown mode. NOTE: No
credit is given for NRC imposed shutdowns.










Usually, the preceding calendar month. Can also be
the preceding calendar year (year-to-date), or the
life-span of a unit (cumulative).
Maximum net electrical generation to which the unit
is restricted during the report period due to the
state of equipment, external conditions,
administrative reasons, or a direction by NRC.
Planned removal of a unit from service for refueling,
inspection, training, or maintenance. Those outages
which do not fit the definition of "Forced Outage"
perforce are "Scheduled Outages."
Period following initial criticality during which
the unit is tested at successively higher levels,
culminating with operation at full power for a








- Using Licensed Thermal Power
- Using Nameplate Rating
- Using DER
- Using MDC Gross
- Using MDC Net
Following this phase, the utility generally considers
the unit to be available for commercial operation.
The set of equipment uniquely associated with the
reactor, including turbine generators and ancillary
equipment, considered as a single electrical energy
production facility.
The total clock hours in the report period during
which the unit operated on-line or was capable of such
operation. (Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours + Hours
Generator On-Line.)
Unit Available Hours x 100
Period Hours
Gross Thermal Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x Lie. Thermal Power
Gross Electrical Energy Generated x 1 00
Period Hours x Nameplate Rating
Net Electrical Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x DER
Gross Electrical Energy Generated x 1 00
Period Hours x MDC Gross
Net Electrical Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x MDC Net
NOTE: IfMDC Gross and/or MDC Net have not been determined, the DER Net





Forced Outage Hours x 1 00
Unit Service Hours + Forced Outage Hours
The removal of the unit from on-line operation for
economic or other similar reasons when operation could
have been continued.
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UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN The total clock hours in the report period during
HOURS which the unit was in reserve shutdown mode.
UNIT SERVICE FACTOR Unit Service Hours x 1 00
Period Hours
UNIT SERVICE HOURS See "Hours Generator On-Line.
"
Morpl.dbf
DOCKET Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
DOCKETA Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
RPTPERIOD Month and year of reporting period (MMYY)
UTL_CONTCT Utility contact concerning monthly operating data.
FIRSTNAME Contact's first name
UTL_PHONE Contact's phone number.
NAMERTG Nameplate rating.
DERNET Design electrical rating.
MDC_GROSS Gross maximum dependable capacity
MDC_NET Net maximum dependable capacity.
CHANGES Changes occuring in ratings or capacities.
PWR_RSTRCT Power level to which restricted.
RSTRCTRSN Reason for power level restriction.
GBRPTHRS Report period hours
YTDRPT Year-to-date report period hours.
CUM_RPT Cumulative report period hours
CRJTCOMM Critical hours.
YTDCRIT Year-to-date critical hours.
CUMCRIT Cumulative critical hours.
RESHTD HRS Reactor reserve shutdown hours.
<
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YTDRESHTD Year-to-date reactor reserve shutdown hours
CUM_RESHTD Cumulative reactor reserve shutdown hours.
ONLINEHRS Generator on-line hours.
YTD_ONLINE Year-to-date generator on-line hours.
CUM_ONLINE Cumulative generator on-line hours.
URESHDHRS Unit reserve shutdown hours.
YTDURESHD Year-to-date unit reserve shutdown hours
CUMURESHD Cumulative unit reserve shutdown hours.
GROSSTHER Gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
YTD_THER Year-to-date gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
CUM_THER Cumulative gross thermal energy generated (MWH).
GROSS_ELEC Gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
YTD_G_ELEC Year-to-date gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
CUM_G_ELEC Cumulative gross electrical energy generated (MWH).
NET_ELEC Net electrical energy generated (MWH).
YTD_N_ELEC Year-to-date net electrical energy generated (MWH).
CUM_N_ELEC Cumulative net electrical energy generated (MWH).
SEVICEFAC Unit service factor.
YTDSVFAC Year-to-date unit service factor.
CUM_SV_FAC Cumulative unit service factor.
AVAIL_FAC Unit availability factor.
YTD_AV_FAC Year-to-date unit availability factor
CUM_AV_FAC Cumulative unit availability factor.
MDC_CAP Unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
YTD_MDC_CP Year-to-date unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
CUM_MDC_CP Cumulative unit maximum dependable capacity (MDC Net) factor.
12:
DERCAP Unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity factor.
YTDDERCP Year-to-date unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity
factor.
CUMDERCP Cumulative unit design electrical rating (DER Net) capacity
factor.
FO_RATE Unit forced outage rate.
YTDFORTE Year-to-date unit forced outage rate
CUMFORTE Cumulative unit forced outage rate.
FORCEDHRS Forced outage hours.
YTD_FD_HRS Year-to-date forced outage hours.
CUM_FD_HRS Cumulative forced outage hours
SCHSHTDWN Scheduled shutdowns over next six months.
EST_STRTUP If currently shutdown, estimated startup date.
MORCOMMTS Monthly operating report notes or comments.
POACOMMTS Not used for Gray Book
THERMALPWR Licensed thermal power
RPTHRS Not used for Gray Book.
CRITHRS Not used for Gray Book.
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M0RP2 DBF - Unit Shutdown and Power Reduction
DOCKET Last three digits of the facility's docket number (05000nnn).
RPTPERIOD Month and year of the reporting period (MMYY).
OUTG_SEQ Sequential number assigned to outage.
OUTGDATE Date outage began.
OUTGTYPE Outage type (forced or scheduled). F or S
OUTGHRS Outage duration in hours.
OUTGREASN Outage reason. A = Equipment Failure
B = Maintenance or Test
C = Refueling
D = Regulatory Restriction
E = Operator Training and License Examination
F = Administrative
G = Operational Error
H = Other
OUTG_METH Method of shutting down reactor.
1 = Manual Shutdown
2 = Manual Scram
3 = Automatic Scram
4 = Continuation of Shutdown from previous Month
5 = Power Reduction
9 = Power Hold or Continuation of Shutdown During
same month

















The net electrical energy generated during the day
(measured from 0001 to 2400 hours inclusive) in
megawatts hours divided by 24 hours.
The maximum thermal power of the reactor authorized
by the NRC, expressed in megawatts.
Date unit was declared by utility owner to be
available for the regular production of electricity;
usually related to satisfactory completion of
qualification tests as specified in the purchase
contract and to accounting policies and practices
of utility.
The nominal net electrical output of the unit
specified by the utility and used for the purpose
of plant design.
An outage required to be initiated no later than the
weekend following discovery of an offhormal
condition.
FORCED OUTAGE HOURS The clock hours during the report period that a unit
is unavailable due to forced outages.
GROSS ELEC ENERGY
GENERATED (MWH)
Electrical output of the unit during the report
period as measured at the output terminals of the








The clock hours from the beginning of a specified
situation until its end. For outage durations, the
clock hours during which the unit is not in power
production.
The thermal energy produced by the unit during the
report period as measured or computed by the licensee
in megawatt hours.
Also, "Unit Service Hours." The total clock hours in
the report period during which the unit operated with
breakers closed to the station bus. These hours
added to the total outage hours experienced by the
unit during the report period, shall equal the hours
in the report period.
For units in power ascension at the end of the period,
the gross hours from the beginning of the period or
the first electrical production, whichever comes last,
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whichever comes last, to the end of the period.
For units in commercial operation at the end of the
period, the gross hours from the beginning of the
period or of commercial operation, whichever comes




The total clock hours in the report period during




(MDC GROSS) (GROSS MWe)
MAX DEPENDABLE
CAPACITY NET
(MDC Net) (Net MWe)
Dependable main-unit gross capacity, winter or summer,
whichever is smaller. The dependable capacity varies
because the unit efficiency varies during the year
due to cooling water temperature variations. It is
the gross electrical output as measured at the output
terminals of the turbine generator during the most
restrictive seasonal conditions (usually summer).






The nameplate power designation of the generator
in megavolt amperes (MVA) times the nameplate
rating power factor of the generator. NOTE: The
nameplate rating of the generator may not be
indicative of the maximum dependable capacity, since
some other item of equipment of a lesser rating
(e.g., turbine) may limit unit output.
Gross electrical output of the unit measured at the
output terminals of the turbine generator during the
reporting period, minus the normal station service
electrical energy utilization. If this quantity is
less than zero, a negative number should be recorded.
OUTAGE
OUTAGE DATE
A situation in which no electrical production takes
place.
As reported on Appendix D of Reg. Guide 1. 16, the date
of the start of the outage. If continued from a
previous month, report the same outage date but change
"Method of Shutting Down Reactor" to "4 (continuations)"
and add a note: "Continuation from previous month."
OUTAGE DURATION The total clock hours of the outage measured from
the beginning of the report period or the outage,
whichever comes last, to the end of the report period
or the outage, whichever comes first.
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OUTAGE NUMBER A number unique to the outage assigned by the
licensee. The same number is reported each month
in which the outage is in progress. One format is
"76-05" for the fifth outage to occur in 1976.
PERIOD HOURS
POWER REDUCTION
See "Hours in Reporting Period."
A reduction in the Average Daily Power Level of more
than 20% from the previous day. All power reductions
are defined as outages of zero hours duration for the
purpose of computing unit service and availability
factors, and forced outaae rate.
REACTOR AVAILABLE
HOURS
The total clock hours in the report period during
which the reactor was critical or was capable of
being made critical. (Reactor Reserve Shutdown
Hours + Hours Reactor Critical.)
REACTOR AVAILABILITY
FACTOR




The cessation of criticality in the reactor for
administrative or other similar reasons when operation





The total clock hours in the report period that the
reactor is in reserve shutdown mode. NOTE: No
credit is given for NRC imposed shutdowns.










Usually, the preceding calendar month. Can also be
the preceding calendar year (year-to-date), or the
life-span of a unit (cumulative).
Maximum net electrical generation to which the unit
is restricted during the report period due to the
state of equipment, external conditions,
administrative reasons, or a direction by NRC.
Planned removal of a unit from service for refueling,
inspection, training, or maintenance. Those outages
which do not fit the definition of "Forced Outage"
perforce are "Scheduled Outages."
Period following initial criticality during which
the unit is tested at successively higher levels,
culminating with operation at full power for a
sustained period and completion of warranty runs.
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•
Following this phase, the utility generally considers









- Using Licensed Thermal Power
- Using Nameplate Rating
- Using DER
- Using MDC Gross
- Usins MDC Net
The set of equipment uniquely associated with the
reactor, including turbine generators and ancillary
equipment, considered as a single electrical energy
production facility.
The total clock hours in the report period during
which the unit operated on-line or was capable of such
operation. (Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours + Hours
Generator On-Line.)
Unit Available Hours x 100
Period Hours
Gross Thermal Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x Lie. Thermal Power
Gross Electrical Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x Nameplate Rating
Net Electrical Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x DER
Gross Electrical Energy Generated x 100
Period Hours x MDC Gross
Net Electrical Energy Generated x 1 00
Period Hours x MDC Net
NOTE IfMDC Gross and/or MDC Net have not been determined, the DER Net




Forced Outage Hours x 100
Unit Service Hours + Forced Outage Hours
UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN The removal of the unit from on-line operation for
economic or other similar reasons when operation could
have been continued.
UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN The total clock hours in the report period during
HOURS which the unit was in reserve shutdown mode.
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UNIT SERVICE FACTOR Unit Service Hours x 100
Period Hours
UNIT SERVICE HOURS See "Hours Generator On-Line.
"
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Appendix 5. BWR/4 Operating Cycle Skylines 27 May 1998
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 132
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
Appendix 5. BWR/4 Operating Cycle Skylines 27 May 1998
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277, Peach Bottom 2, RF 9/16/94-10/21/94 (35d), Op 10/21/94-9/12/96 (693 d), (84.6, 88.9, 95.8%)
100% , , m n w r*
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278, Peach Bottom 3, RF 9/13/93-1/9/92 (118d), Op 1/9/92-9/16/93 (618 d), (67.9, 80.9, 82.8%)
278, Peach Bottom 3, RF 9/18/93-1 1/15/93 (58d), Op 1 1/15/93-9/21/95 (676 d), (79.9, 86.8, 92.9%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 133
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
Appendix 5. BWR74 Operating Cycle Skylines 27 May 1998
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321, Hatch 1, RF9/21/94-1 1/5/94 (45d), Op 11/5/94-3/22/96 (504 d), (83.9, 91.4, 93 8%)
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325, Briunswick 1, RF 3/8/93-2/11/94 (340d), Op 2/1 1/94-4/1/95 (415 d), (53.7, 97.7, 97.7%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 1 34
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted









325, Brunswick 1. RF 4/01/95-5/15/95 (44d), Op 5/15/95-9/27/96 (502 d), (81.7, 88 9, 89 4%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 135
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
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341, Fermi 2, RF 3/12/94-1/18/95 (312d), Op 1/18/95-3/12/96 (618 d), (50.4, 75.9, 77.6%)
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352, Limenck 1, RF 3/20/92-7/9/92 (111d), Op7/9/92-2/5/94 (577 d), (79.8, 95.1, 92.3%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 136
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
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354, Hope Creek, RF 9/12/92-1 1/10/92 (59d), Op 1 1/10/92-3/5/94 (481 d), (84.4, 94.8, 94.8%)
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354, Hope Creek, RF 3/5/94^1/27/94 (53d), Op 4/47/94-1 1/10/95 (563 d), (80.2, 87 8, 88.3%)
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366, Hatch 2, RF 9/16/92-11/21/92 (66d), Op 1 1/21/92-3/15/94 (480 d), (62.7, 71.3, 81.0%)
X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 137
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted




















387, Susquehanna 1, RF 3/6/92-5/16/92 (71d), Op 5/16/92-9/25/93 (498 d), (71.2, 81.4, 81.4%)
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387, Susquehanna 1, RF 9/25/93-1/22/94 (119d), Op 1/22/94-3/24/95 (427 d), (75.7, 96.8, 96.8%)
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387, Susquehanna 1, RF 3/25/95-5/6/95 (42d), Op5/6/95-9/8/96 (492 d), (81.8, 88.8, 89.2%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 138
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
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388, Susquehanna 2, RF 9/12/92-1 1/14/92 (63d), Op 11/14/92-4/15/94 (518 d), (81.0, 90.8, 90.8%)
100%
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388, Susquehanna 2, RF 3/14/94-6/10/94 (88d), Op 6/10/94-9/12/95 (460 d), (79.6, 94.9, 94.9%)
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X axis - Operating cycle days following refueling 1 39
Cycle Capacity Factor,
Operating Period Capacity Factor,
Op per CF coast down adjusted
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Appendix 8 LGS unavailability data, sorted by failed system 1992-1996 27 May 1998
A B C D E F G H I J K L M














4 2 2/24/95 Load drop 28.000 1 01 Air removal SJAE nozzle Broken Er DF A
5 2 10/1/93 Load drop 1 090 04 Ore water Pump Maintenance EF/WP M
6 1 11/1/94 Load drop 1,200 005 Computer PI program Would not run EF D
7 2 5/9/92 Load drop 36 960 1 40 Condensate Pump Beanng Misaligned EF/WD D
8 2 10/12/96 Load drop 37463 1 35 Condensate Pump motor Vibration FME HF/PI 10006201 O
9 1 6/19/93 Load drop 11.050 42 Condensate Motor Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
10 1 5/1/93 Load drop " 313 28 Condensate Motor Bearing Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
11 2 6/2/92 Load drop 7,140 027 Condensate Pump motor Beanng Misaligned EF/WD D
12 2 5/1/93 Load aroc 6,410 24 Condensate Pump motor Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
13 2 6/26/93 Load drop 2.967 11 Condensate Pump Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
14 2 6/28/93 Load drop 2.967 011 Condensate Pump Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
15 2 6/29/93 Load drop 2.967 011 Condensate Pump Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
16 2 3/1/94 Load drop 1504 06 Condensate Pump EF/WD D
17 2 4/1/92 Load drop 750 0.03 Condensate Water box Leaks EF/WP A
18 1 8/28/93 Load drop 734 003 Condensate Pump Beanng Misaligned EF/WD Realigned D
19
2 12/16/96 Shut down 139,200 5 00 Condenser Expansion joint Leak HF 10006422 2F20, DF A
20 : 9/23/92 Load drop 58,625 2,22 Condenser Tube Leaks EF/WP A
21




22 2 6/1/96 Load drop 12,619 45 Condenser Tube Leaks EF/WP A
23 2 10/1/92 Load drop 6,375 24 Condenser Tube Leaks EF/WP A
24 1 7/9/94 Load drop 6,290 24 Condenser Tubes Cleaning EF/WP A
25 1 12/1/93 Load drop 4020 15 Condenser Watercox Cleaning EF/WP A
26













1 7/25/96 Scram 93,663 3 36 EHC F/Vcard Failure Infantile failure EF/WP 10005909 A
29






2 8/20/95 Scram 69,396 2,49 EHC Relay High
impedance/ NC
contact
























2 4/29/96 Load drop 38,939 1 40 EHC «3 CV piping Leak Weld repair
failure




35 2 5/16/93 Load drop 16,493 62 EHC #2 TCV servo Oil leak Indeterminant EF 93-05-20 TT M
36 2 6/3/95 Load drop 17 150 0.62 EHC #4 CIV Leak EF M
37
1 9/7/93 Scram 146, 784 5 56 Electncal Breaker Failed to
reclose
Spunous EFAfVD 10000021 D
38 2 10/19/94 Scram 77,754 2 95 Electncal D24 Bus De-energized Inadvertent HF/OA O
39













41 1 3/1/94 Load drop 10,800 41 FW LCS EF/WD D
42 1 7/13/92 Load drop 8,566 32 FW RFP turbine Insulation fire Oil soaked HF/PI 92-07-10 OM O
43




EFA/VD 93-0404 RRB D
44





HF/OA 10004173 RRB O
45
2 9/8/94 Load drop 5,220 20 FW Check valve
cap
Leak EF A
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A B c D E F
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G H I J K L M
46 1 10/8/94 I Load drop 3829 15 FW LCS EF/WD D
47




EF/WD I0004299 RRB D
48
1 2/7/93 Load drop 3,510 0.13 FW Pressure switcr Low pressure Spunous EF/WD 93-02-16 RRB D
49
2 1/11/92 Load drop 3,430 013 FW Turoine
controller
Malfunction Relay EF/WD D
50
1 4/24/95 Load drop 2,230 08 FW Pressure switch Failed low EF/WD D
51





EF/WD 93-04-18 RRB D
52 1 12/1/93 Load drop 930 004 FW Pump EF A
53 1 7/29/94 Load drop 570 02 FW Tnp lever Actuated Inadvertent HF/OA O
54 2 2/10/92 Load drop FW Pump Tnp EF/WD D
55 2 8/1/92 Load drop 10,750 41 FW heating Vent line Leaks FAC EF/WP A
56
1 1/21/92 Load drop 7,030 0.27 FW heating Logic High level
sensed
Spunous HF/MS 92-01-10 NoPM M
57 2 6/17/95 Load drop 4.970 18 FW heating Dump valves Actuator Age EF A
58 1 8/2/96 Load drop 1,468 005 FW heating Drain valve Malfunction HF/PCM DF M
59 2 7/18/92 Load drop 1,353 0.05 FW heating Vent line Leaks FAC EF/WP A
60 2 9/5/95 Load drop 370 001 FW heating Valve Leak EF A
61 1 4/11/96 Load drop 370 0.01 FW heating Dram cooler Tube leak Pcor Design EF/WD D
62






1 9/2/95 Load drop 39,426 1 49 H2
Reccmbiner
Recorder Logic MOD PMT LTA HF/PI I0004403 O
64
2 9/2/95 Load drop 7,470 027 H2
Recombiner
Recorder Log;: MOD PMT LTA HF/PI I0004403 O
65
1 8/23/93 Load drop 725 03 Instrument Air Dryer package Gasket Failed EF M
66
2 6/6/96 Load drop 378 01 Isoohase bus
cooling








1 3/24/96 Shutdown 203.260 7 30 Mam steam SRV Leak EF/WD 1E07 D
69 2 9/1/94 Load drop 28,290 1 07 Mam steam Valve Leak E c A
70 2 9/1/94 Load drop 6,500 25 Main turbine «2 MSV EF/WP A
71




1 1/1/92 Load drop 2 904 011 Mam turoine Pressure
instrument RV
RV closed Mispositioned HF/OA 92-01-02 SU, DF, TT O
73 2 4/1/92 Load drop 1,039 04 Main turbine Vac switch Set point drift EF/WP A
74















1 8/20/95 Shutdown 342,276 12 97 Reactor Fuel Leak EF Maintenanc
e outage
F


























82 1 1/2/95 Load drop 18 600 70 Recirc Seal Leak Age EF Reseaied A
83
2 6/26/95 Load drop 14,115 51 Recirc Temperature
switch
Spiked high Spunous EF/WD 10004172 RPT D
84 2 2/24/94 Load drop 10.0S0 38 Recirc Pump Tnp Fuses pulled HF/OA O
85






HF/PI I0003924 RRB O
86
2 2/16/94 Load drop 7,150 27 Recirc Recorder Mislabelled LTA MOO
review/ PMT
HF/PI 10001491 RRB O
87 1 1/30/95 Load drop 7,000 27 Recirc MGset Trip Bumped HF/OA O
88
2 7/17/95 Load drop 5,600 20 Recirc Temperature
switch
Spiked high Spunous EF/WD 10004172 RPT D
89
1 10/16/92 Load drop 990 004 Recirc RX level signal Low level
sensed
Channel noise EF/WD 92-10-21 RRB D
Data sorted by system, lost generation Page168 LGS POC VT ANGUS
Appendix 8. LGS unavailability data, sorted by failed system 1992-1996 27 May 1998
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90 1 7/19/95 Loaa arop 700 03 Recirc MG set Perturoations Operator HF/OA O
91
i 5/21/96 Scram 75,095 2 70 RPS Logic No 1/2 scram
alarm
Indeterminate HF/PI 10005675 O
92




2 9/8/94 Loaa drop 28,650 1 09 swc Y-stramer Clogged Generator
hydrogen leak
EF/WD 10002830 TT D
94 2 10/6/96 Loaa drop 20,859 75 swc Y-stramer Clogged EF/WO D
95 2 11/22/95 Load drop 15,253 55 swc Filters Clogged EF/WD D
96
2 3/17/93 Load drop 8,030 30 swc Varve Valve
mispositioned
LTA procedure HF/PI 93-03-24 SU, DF O
97




Manufacturing HF/C 10006438 F
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